(Issue No. 9-10 , November-December 1991)
The Year in Review You most likely began receiving this bulletin without any warning or justification last March; the Gulf War had just ended, and a great deal of attention was being focused on the international arms trade and its role in bringing about that war. Our goal in producing and distributing the ASM was -and remains- to help channel this attention into concrete action to prevent further third world military build-ups, and there-by reduce the justification for continued large US military budgets. We strive to do this by reporting on the Bush administration's arms sales, and arms sales policies, as presented to Congress in reports and testimony, and also by recounting Congress' relevant actions: legislation, hearings, and rhetoric, noting courageous stands and exposing hypocritical ones. Much has happened in the nine months since we began publication--yet little has changed. More hearings were held and more legislation was introduced in the first session of the 102nd Congress concerning arms sales and the proliferation of missiles and nuclear, chemical and biological weapons than in any other year: A Congressional Research Service report in July catalogued more than 30 relevant bills that were pending, the most notable and far-reaching of which was the moratorium on arms sales to the Middle East championed by the House Foreign Affairs Committee. However, at the close of the first session, few of these measures had passed. The moratorium was weakened at every stage of the legislative process, and the resulting language, as passed in the State Department authorizing bill (PL 102-138), mandates simply that the administration continue the process of dialogue it started last summer with the four other major weapons sellers (see ASM No. 7-8). There were, however, some notable successes. A chemical weapons sanction bill was passed and signed into law (see p. 5), and out of the many good measures introduced last year, a bill that would punish companies aiding in nuclear proliferation is likely to be passed this year. Further, the anticipated $15 billion "Phase II" sale of weapons to Saudi Arabia did not occur last year. The administration obviously did not feel confident that the sale would receive Congressional approval. And the arms industry-administration plan for amending the Export-Import Bank's by-laws to permit Bank financing of weapons exports was beaten back. While the administration flatly opposed Congressional calls for a moratorium on American arms sales, intense Congressional pressure no doubt influenced the administration to embark on the five-power talks to establish common guidelines and to promote consultation and openness in their arms sales to the Middle East. These talks, however, are not aimed at restraint--at least not of US arms transfers. At the same time, the administration aggressively supported US arms sales--as demonstrated by the proposed EXIM Bank financing scheme, government sponsorship of a large trade delegation to the Paris Air Show and stepped up assistance to arms marketers at US embassies abroad. It paid off. And 1991, while not seeing the massive Saudi sales expected, was a good year for the arms business, too. See the box below. (Note: Box not produced online) In defense of the above, and other sales, Assistant Secretary of State Richard Clarke explained last summer that, "It is not US arms transfers that have been the problem in the Middle East's becoming over-armed and falling into wars. Patriots to Israel, AWACS to Saudi Arabia, M-60s to Egypt, F-16s to Bahrain, I-Hawks to the UAE. They have not been the problem. No Middle East state with which the United States had an on-going military relationship at the time has been an aggressor. It was not Kuwait that invaded Iraq. It was not Tunisia that attacked Libya. We have such relations with Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Oman. They are not the problem...." From this carefully-worded statement, the administration's operative assumption seems to be that US arms transfers cannot possibly fuel perceptions of insecurity in neighboring states, and thus perpetuate arms races. Sales in progress 1 November The Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs notifies Congress of the administration's intention to license the commercial sale of "major defense equipment" to Saudi Arabia (license no. DTC-38-91). November 91, p. H9042> 1 November The State Department proposes to license the sale to Malaysia of major military equipment under a commercial license (no. DTC-48-91).
1 November The DSAA notifies Congress of its intention to sell 20 AH-64 Apache helicopter gunships along with 446 "Hellfire" missiles and eight spare Hellfire launchers plus two spare target/night vision systems, three spare EG T700-701 engines, 5,520 70mm rockets, chaff and dispensers and forward area refueling equipment to Greece for $505 million. The deal is to be administered by the Army. Other Apache customers are Israel, Egypt, the UAE, Saudi Arabia and the United States Army. 1 November Congress is notified of another proposed sale to Greece, this one for 16 Harpoon missiles, 64 Standard missiles, 56 Mk. 48 Mod 5 Torpedoes, and 10,000 rounds of 127mm ammunition. The $100 million deal is to be administered by the Navy. 5 November McDonnell Douglas Vice President Robert Trice announces at the Dubai air show that Saudi Arabia has placed an order for 72 F-15 fighter aircraft, a $4-5 billion deal. Trice says that the Saudis had told the administration on 1 November of their desire to buy the 72 Eagles, but that notification is reportedly classified. Both the Pentagon and the State Department are dismayed by this premature announcement, which McDonnell Douglas leaked in an effort to keep its F-15 production line open past 1993, when it is slated to close unless major sales are finalized soon. As Trice would not have made this announcement with-out Saudi approval, the leak is seen as an indication of Saudi impatience with the slow pace of action on weapons purchases the Kingdom wants to make. Senators Howard Metzenbaum and Bob Packwood respond quickly: two weeks after Trice's announcement they have collected 67 Senate signatures on a letter expressing "profound anxiety that such a shipment of arms may be contemplated" while the peace talks continue. On 22 November, Metzenbaum announces that the Saudi Ambassador had assured him that "his country has no intention of pressing forward with plans to purchase 72 F-15 planes at this time." 5 November The State Department notifies Congress of its intention to license the export of major military equipment to Egypt under a commercial license (no. DTC-44-91). 5 November The State Department transmits notification of a proposed commercial license for the export of major military equipment to Saudi Arabia (license no. DTC-41-91). 6 November The State Department transmits notification of a proposed license for the export of commercially licensed major military equipment to Mexico (license no. DTC-1-92). 13 November The State Department sends Congress a Memorandum of Justification for the Presidential Determination "regarding the drawdown of defense articles and services for Mexico." 14 November The Pentagon gives informal, 20-day "pre-notification" of a proposed sale to Saudi Arabia of 14 Patriot fire units and 758 missiles for a price of $3.3 billion. The Saudis reportedly want 26 Patriot batteries total. As part of a $7.3 billion weapons sale in October 1990, Saudi Arabia bought 6 fire units and nearly 400 missiles. In addition, 7 Patriot batteries were transferred to Saudi Arabia in mid-September 1991, allegedly due to increased fears of an Iraqi missile attack. 14 November The President notifies Congress of the continuing threat to US national security and foreign policy posed by the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons, and of his extension, through the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, of the lapsed Export Administration Act. The "emergency" arose when the President vetoed the legislation that Congress had passed in November 1990 to reauthorize the Export Administration Act, because he felt that the sanctions to be invoked in the case of chemical weapons proliferation or use interfered with his presidential prerogatives. 14 November The Pentagon notifies Congress of the Air Force's intention to sell Turkey 350 Maverick air-to-ground missiles, for use on its F-16 aircraft, plus service and logistics assistance for a price of $60 million. 18 November The DSAA transmits notification of the Army's proposed LOA to the Coordination Counciul for North American Affairs (Taiwan) for defense articles and services. 4 December The Under Secretary of State for International Security Affairs, Reginald Bartholomew, has determined, pursuant to section 73 of the AECA (which pertains to implementation of the MTCR guidelines), that a foreign corporation or government has exported MTCR-controlled technologies. The administration, however, has concluded that publication of the finding would be harmful to the national security interests of the United States. This might be the formal public notification of Israel's complicity in South Africa's missile proliferation activities which was reported in the press in October (see ASM No. 7-8). 5 December Formal notification for the sale of 14 Patriot fire units, 758 missiles, 14 radar sets and control stations and 75 launching stations is presented to Congress today. 6 December President Bush notifies Congress that, effective today, he is ending the US embargo on arms transfers to Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary, mandated by the FAA, that has been in place since 1961. In each of the three cases, President Bush declares that the provision of weapons to the East European governments would "strengthen the security of the United States and promote world peace." Left in place are prohibitions on weapons sales to Bulgaria and Romania, although these, too, are reportedly under review. 30 December A rule published in the Federal Register declares that the republics of the former USSR, including the Baltic states, remain "controlled" destinations for exports from the US of a wide range of technologies with potential strategic military applications. Special export licenses will be granted by the Commerce Department only if they, the Pentagon and the State Department determine that export of a particular item will not jeopardize US national security interests. Speeches, letters, etc. 7 November The FY91 defense authorization act--PL 101-510 (Section 825)--requires that the Department of Defense, with input from the Commerce Department, submit an annual report on the defense industrial base. An interim report was forwarded to Congress in March 1991, and today the final report is sent to the HASC and SASC. The report calls for the unprecedented inclusion of defense company executives in defining long-term R&D and investment priorities and strategies for the Pentagon (full citation, p. 6). 7 November House Energy and Commerce Committee Chairman John Dingell sends a letter to an Israeli Ministry of Defense official, notifying him that the Ministry's 250-person, New York-based, arms purchasing office that administers Israel's FMS credits is under investigation by Dingell's committee. The investigation was inspired in large part by the "Dotan affair"--the scandal named for the Israeli AF Brig. Gen. who was sentenced in March by an Israeli court for bribery and corruption in soliciting kick-backs from General Electric and conspiring to embezzle some of the US supplied FMS funds. (The US gives Israel $1.8 billion per year in FMS grant monies for procurement of US- and Israeli-produced weapons.) The committee's probe is to provide a wide review of the mission's buying activities and its contact with US companies. It will also assess the Ministry's role in the US foreign military assistance program. 18 November President Bush transmits to Congress the administration's report on Iraqi compliance with the UN Security Council resolutions required by PL 102-1. 19 November Making a plug for S.3-09, the Nonproliferation and Arms Transfer Control Act that he introduced last January [see ASM no. 1 (March 1991)], Sen. John McCain says that to make the Gulf War victory a lasting one, the US must "make every possible effort to ensure that no hostile or aggressive state again arises with the capacity to threaten the region or world peace." The way to do that is to ensure that "key allies" like Israel continue to receive weapons as desired, but that "key threats" like Iran, Iraq, Libya and Syria "do not make major further additions to their vast arsenals." In order to assess the existing threat, he asked the CRS to make an unclassified survey of the flow of arms to the Middle East from 2 August 1990 to 1 November 1991. He finds the CRS' findings disturbing, because they show that "Iraq is the only potential aggressor state in the Middle East that is shut off from the flow of arms. ... [D]eadly arms transfers continue to states who are still aggressive and terrorist in character." To rectify the situation, he recommends the following four measures: 1) keep up the flow of grant military assistance and arms sales to Israel; 2) maintain the designation of Syria, Iran and Libya as "terrorist states"; 3) make international arms control agreements a top priority, but "bearing in mind that the problem is not all states in the region, but aggressor-terrorist states like Iran, Iraq, Libya and Syria"; and 4) adopt S.309, which he says would "use the power of the American economy to sanction those who sell weapons and technology to the above named states." 26 November Sen. Bob Graham introduces two bills on US arms transfers, one of which would change the 30 calendar-day notification requirement for arms sales proposed to countries other than NATO-members and major non-NATO allies (Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Israel, and South Korea) to 30 in-session days. He says that thirty calendar days does not give Congress enough time to consider sensitive sales, noting that the administration sent Congress a proposal for a $365 million sale to Saudi Arabia of bombs and missiles just before Congress' August recess. "Those of us not on the oversight committees [Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs] simply did not have appropriate time to carefully consider this sale. The American people are precluded from any understanding of the rationale of this sale." The administration justified the August weapons sale to Saudi Arabia "by suggesting that `Saudi Arabia needs to replenish inventories expended during Operation Desert Storm.'" He says that Congress needs to be asking, and needs answers to, a number of questions in order to make informed decisions: * What were the regional weapons inventories before the war? * What portion of those inventories were used during the war? * How much military hardware did the US leave in Saudi Arabia? * What are our overall strategic objectives in selling military hardware in the Middle East since the end of the war? * How are arms sales advancing our interests? Graham notes that the US has contracted to transfer about $7.5 billion worth of arms to the Middle East since last Spring (although it is actually a much higher sum--see p. 1). "I accept that dollar value in and of itself does not present a complete picture of each sale," he notes. "But dollar value is certainly one important indicator of what is happening here." "We need a long-term strategy and clear definition of our goals. The United States has a historic opportunity to change the way we and other major arms suppliers do business in this volatile region. We must not squander that opportunity." He introduces legislation (S.2097--see p. 6) that would require the administration to report to Congress how each sale it proposes to the Persian Gulf/Arabian Peninsula would affect the regional military balance, as well the sale's impact on multilateral efforts at regional arms control. Notes from some hearings 6 November The HFAC Western Hemisphere subcommittee hears testimony on legislation that would transfer US military assistance money into a reconstruction fund. Former Ambassador to El Salvador Edwin Corr testifies, along with representatives of several non-governmental organizations: Michael Posner (Lawyer's Committee for Human Rights); Heather Foote (Unitarian Universalist Service Committee); and Alex Wilde (WOLA). Several other NGOs submit testimony. North Korean Nukes 21 November The HFAC Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee holds a hearing on North Korea's nuclear program. In his opening statement, Chairman Solarz hails the recent announcements by President Bush (that the US is withdrawing all tactical nuclear weapons) and by South Korean President Roh (that South Korea would neither seek nuclear weapons nor allow positioning of nuclear weapons on its territory). He says, "While I certainly hope that the North responds to these two bold and far-reaching initiatives by agreeing to terminate its nuclear program and permitting international safeguards of its nuclear facilities, it is far from clear that the North will actually do so." He outlines four policy options which could be pursued if North Korea does not open up to international inspection its nuclear facilities: 1) do nothing; 2) encourage or permit South Korea to acquire its own nuclear weapons capability; 3) pursue a global sanctions regime against the North; and/or 4) take some military action against North Korea's nuclear facilities. Former Commander-in-Chief of UN forces and ROK-US Combined Forces Command in South Korea Gen. John Wickham (ret.), former Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle, and Han Sung-Joo of the Korea University provide expert testimony. Send in the Troops? Prof. Han says: "The critical issue is not whether Pyongyang will sign an IAEA safeguards agreement, as I think it will offer to do, but how an effective inspection can be enforced and North Korea's nuclear program stopped. The North Korean nuclear program must not and cannot be allowed to proceed. Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) is not a viable option. Neither is the use of military force an acceptable option at this time." He continues, "Those of us who live on the Korean peninsula know how fragile the peace there is, and hence are concerned that any hasty action on the part of the United States or the Republic of South Korea could bring about a situation that it is intended to prevent." He notes that Japan and China both have a great deal of leverage with North Korea; "Japan is doing its part by refusing to provide economic assistance to North Korea unless it stops its nuclear program." Richard Perle asserts that the IAEA cannot possibly stop the North Korean nuclear program, and, furthermore, acceptance by North Korea of IAEA safeguards would hinder US military options. The use of force is the only option that can succeed, he argues, and it is needed soon. Gen. Wickham disagrees, saying that since we don't yet have a full intelligence reading of the situation, it would be unwise to contemplate a military solution now. Solarz asks the panelists whether they think sanctions could work; Perle says "no," sanctions failed in Iraq and its "absurd" to think they could succeed in North Korea. Wickham says "yes, possibly," since North Korea is heavily dependent on imports from China for food and oil. North Korean Nukes II 25 November The Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the SFRC holds a hearing on North Korea's nuclear weapons program. Alan Cranston presides, and several nuclear proliferation and North Korean experts testify. Jeremy Stone (President of the Federation of American Scientists) travelled to North Korea in October. He provides a detailed account of the political and economic situation there and makes 20 concrete policy recommendations for dealing with North Korea's nuclear aspirations. He notes that the international community has not adopted sanctions against nuclear proliferators in other cases (Israel, India, Pakistan) and says that if the DPRK's failure to fulfill its NPT obligations becomes the basis for international action against it, the North might simply withdraw from the NPT. Therefore, he suggests that the continuing state of "no war, no peace" between the North and South be the basis for action. Stone also says: "I do not believe that the United States has the standing, or the right, to threaten military action against the DPRK over this issue, or to assist others in doing so. ... But I would support going beyond diplomatic and political pressures to economic embargoes or boycotts, so serious is the matter. And for the DPRK, with its economic problems, such pressures are threats to its continuation. They need foreign oil and food and hard currency." Leonard Spector (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace) outlines the history of North Korea's nuclear program and recent diplomatic maneuvers by the US and ROK to frustrate North Korea's nuclear ambitions. Spector warns against a military strike on the nuclear facility at Yongbyon, saying that Israel's attack on Iraq's Osirak facility in 1981 is not a valid model of comparison: "while Iraq was unable to retaliate against Israel in 1981, North Korea could strike back heavily against South Korea in the event of an attack against Yongbyon by American and/or South Korean forces." North Korea could do this most readily by targeting its Scud missiles on Seoul. Joseph Churba (International Security Council) and Gary Milhollin (Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control) also testify. CIA Chief Gates Gives Threat Assessment 10 December CIA Director Robert Gates testifies before the HASC on the situation in the Soviet Union and on the other "threats" now driving US military planning. He says that conflict between the former Republics in the disintegrating Soviet Union and the accelerating world-wide proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons pose the greatest danger to the United States' and international security. He says: "Over the next decade we expect chemical-tipped, mobile short-range missiles to become wide-spread from North Africa through South Asia," but he notes that aside from Soviet and allied forces, only China now has the ability to attack US territory with missiles. Legislation passed and pending Conditioning China's MFN Status on Non-proliferation The United States-China Act of 1991 conference bill (H.R.2212) is weaker than either the previous House or Senate bills. In it, the policy guidance conditioning a continuation of China's most favored nation trade (MFN) status on, among other things, restraint in its arms sales, is softened to a sense of Congress statement. According to the bill, the President cannot recommend the continuation of China's MFN this June, for a one-year period, if China has not "made overall significant progress" in curbing its weapons proliferation practices. This would include ceasing activities prohibited by the MTCR, the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Australia Group. Also, China would have to "take clear and unequivocal steps to assure that the PRC is not assisting and will not assist any non-nuclear state, directly or indirectly, in acquiring nuclear explosive devises or materials and components for such devices." Under the "Definitions" clause of the legislation, "significant progress" in its arms export policies cannot be said to have occurred, specifically, if after 26 November 91 China transfers to Syria or Iran "ballistic missile or missile launchers for the weapons systems known as the M-9 or M-11" or "material, equipment, or technology which would contribute significantly to the manufacture of a nuclear explosive device." The bill was passed in the House on 26 November by an overwhelming 409-21 vote; it awaits action in the Senate. The administration maintains that it will veto any bill that places conditions on China's MFN status. Stronger CBW Sanctions Bill Becomes Law The Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (H.R.3409), was written into title III of H.R.1724, a bill containing unrelated trade and unemployment compensation measures. This bill supersedes the CBW sanctions contained in the just-passed State Department authorization bill (H.R.1415), and adds import bans against companies that have aided in proliferation of these types of weapons. The bill prohibits the US government from contracting for any goods with such firms. It was passed by both houses on 26 November and signed into law on 4 December as PL 102-182. Ballistic Missile, Nuclear, Chemicaland Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Support Act of 1991 This bill, S.2124, was introduced by Sen. Dale Bumpers on 27 November and referred to the SFRC. Partially redundant to the above CBW sanctions, it would prohibit for a period of ten years the importation into the US or its territories any goods produced or provided by companies that the President certifies have "knowingly participated in the Iraqi or North Korean programs to develop ballistic missiles or nuclear, chemical or biological weapons." This measure had been amended to the "General Provisions" section of the FY92 defense appropriations bill, but was reluctantly dropped in conference due to jurisdictional disputes. In noting their strong support for the intent of such a provision, the conferees called on the President to provide in both a classified and an unclassified version a report to the HASC and SASC assessing "the contribution that [western] companies made to Iraq's NBC and ballistic missile capabilities and a listing of these companies. The companies should include those that provided financial services, transportation, and other essential services as well as hardware and software support." Resolutions calling for end to IMET aid to Indonesia On 14 November, both chambers of Congress introduced resolutions condemning the Indonesian army's slaughter two days previously of 50-150 peaceful demonstrators in occupied East Timor and calling for, in the case of the Senate version (S.Con.Res.77), an immediate suspension of US supplied International Military Educational Training (IMET) funds to the Indonesian government. The House version (H.Con.Res.240) would make the provision of IMET funds conditional on the Indonesian government "conducting a thorough and impartial investigation of these killings and prosecuting those responsible for them." On 27 November the House sought to amend the Senate bill by substituting the text of its bill, but the Senate disagreed. The matter awaits action after Congress resumes work on 21 January. From 1979 to 1988, $540 million worth of US weaponry was sold to Indonesia; US supplied M-16s were reportedly used in the November massacre. Byrd Still Trying to Link Arms Sales To War Debt H.J.Res. 157, the emergency supplemental appropriation bill which provides $4.1 billion to cover further Operation Desert Storm expenses, bans arms sales to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia until those countries make good on their war bills. The ban enters into effect 120 days after enactment of the bill. As originally sponsored by Appropriations Committee Chairman Robert Byrd, the provision would have stopped cold any arms sales to Kuwat or Saudi Arabia presented to Congress by the administration on or after 2 August 1990, until the two countries pay their remaining $3.3 billion in outstanding pledges. Byrd passed a similar provision in last spring's Desert Storm Supplemental Budget Bill, but the administration, and Congress themselves, have ignored it, citing a differing interpretation of the law. This version leaves less room for ambiguity, but the "effective 120 days after enact ment" clause was amended to it by Sen. Edward Kennedy, thus allowing those sales already negotiated to proceed. Kennedy says his amendment will prevent thousands of defense contractor layoffs that would result from the cancellation of $10 billion in already negotiated and approved sales with the two countries. The bill was passed by both houses in November. Cascading Bill Passes On 27 November, the House and Senate passed H.R.3807, the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty Implementation Act of 1991. The bill amends the AECA to allow the President to transfer tanks, artillery and armored combat vehicles to NATO countries in conjunction with the implementation of the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty. The bill was supported by the administration, the Pentagon, NATO and Sen. Joseph Biden. Said Biden: "This implementing legislation for the CFE Treaty is designed to minimize the impact of the treaty on United States equipment in Europe. If we pass this legislation, the United States will not be required to destroy any tanks or other equipment as a result of the treaty. ... Without this legislation, the United States would be required to dismantle according to treaty procedures about 2,000 battle tanks, 400 armored vehicles, and 100 artillery pieces." Destroying these weapons, he says, would cost $40 million. Instead, this legislation would transfer the arms--for free--to the southern flank NATO countries: Turkey, Greece, Spain and Portugal. It was signed into law on 12 December as PL 102-228. `October Surprise' Resolutions Resolutions introduced in each house (S.R.198 and H.R.258) would authorize money for investigations into the "October surprise" theory that the Reagan/Bush campaign team entered into secret negotiations with revolutionary Iran, with a possible promise of arms to Iran if the hostages' release was delayed until after the election. Congress is partisanly divided on the issue. The House adjourned on 27 November without discussion of the resolution; the Senate resolution was stalled on 22 November when there were insufficient votes to end a Republican-led filibuster and bring a vote on the issue. The resolutions will possibly be pursued in 1992, or instead, a cheaper investigation, under the standing authority of the Middle East subcommittees of the HFAC and SFRC might be undertaken. S.2096 Introduced Introduced by Sen. Bob Graham on 26 November, this bill would extend the Congressional review period for proposed arms sales to 30 days during which Congress is in session, rather than 30 calendar days. While members of the Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations Committees might not feel this is a necessary measure, since the executive branch routinely provides more than the 30 days notice required, members not on the oversight committees are left in the dark. The bill was referred to the Foreign Relations Committee. S.2097 Introduced Also introduced by Sen. Graham on 26 November, this bill would require more detailed justification of US weapons sales to Persian Gulf states than is currently required. Specifically, with any sales notification, the administration would be required to provide the Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations Committees with an analysis of: the military balance in the region, including the nature of the threat facing the recipient of the arms; the recipient's "legitimate defensive requirements including current inventories of major defense articles"; how the sale affects multilateral efforts at regional arms control; how the sale affects bilateral security agreements; and the extent to which the proposed sale is necessary to replenish stocks expended in Operation Desert Shield/Storm. These reports would be provided in both classified and unclassified form. Recent congressional publications America and Europe Creating an Arms Suppliers' Cartel (hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on European Affairs, 23 April 91) USGPO stock no. 552-070-11567-6: 1991. Cuba in a Changing World: The United States-Soviet-Cuba Triangle (hearing of the Europe and Middle East Subcommittee and the Western Hemisphere Affairs Subcommittee of the HFAC on 30 April and 11 & 31 July 91) USGPO: 1991. The Impact of the Persian Gulf War and the Decline of the Soviet Union on How the United States Does its Defense Business (hearing of the House Armed Services Committee on 27 Feb; 4,8,12,19 March; 12,16,22,25,2-6,30 April; 1 May and 12 June 91) USGPO: 1992. Middle East Arms Supply: Recent Control Initiatives (CRS Issue Brief Order Code No. IB91113), Alfred B. Prados, 10 December 91. Middle East Arms Transfer Policy (hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 6 June 91) USGPO stock no. 552-070-11463-7: 1991. Near East Arms Transfers: August 2, 1990 - November 1, 1991, CRS Report for Congress (order no. 91-839F), Richard Grimmett et al., 2 December 91. Post-Invasion Panama: Status of Democracy and the Civilian Casualties Controversy (hearing of the House Foreign Affairs Western Hemisphere Subcommittee 17 & 30 July 91) USGPO stock no. 552-070-11562-5: 1991. Proliferation Watch (Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs), vol. 2 no. 4 (July-August 1991), 12 pp. Report to Congress on the Defense Industrial Base (Department of Defense, Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition) November 1991. Soviet Military Conversion (hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee on 19 September 91) USGPO: 1991. Status of 1990 Bilateral Chemical Weapons Agreement and Multilateral Negotiations on Chemical Weapons Ban (hearing of the Senate foreign Relations Committee on 22 May 91) USGPO stock no. 552-070-11511-1: 1991.