



Nuclear Arms Control After the Biden-Putin Summit

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After their June 2021 meeting in Geneva, President Biden and Russia’s President Vladimir Putin released a [Joint Statement on Strategic Stability](#) outlining a path forward for nuclear arms control and risk reduction. They had already [agreed to extend the New START Treaty for five years](#) beyond its planned expiration on February 5, 2021. This treaty limits deployed long-range strategic nuclear weapons but does not address all U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons or other factors that could affect the risk of nuclear use. The first round of new discussions [occurred](#) on July 28, 2021, and a second round [occurred](#) on September 30, 2021. A third round, which convened to [address concerns](#) about Russia’s military activities near Ukraine and Russia’s [demands](#) for security assurances, [occurred on](#) January 10, 2022. After Russia invaded Ukraine in late February, the State Department [noted](#) that the United States did not “have any plans for the next iteration of the Strategic Stability Dialogue.”

Summit Goals

When announcing the planned Geneva meeting, the White House [indicated](#) that the Presidents would “discuss the full range of pressing issues” and would “seek to restore predictability and stability to the U.S.-Russia relationship.” President Biden [emphasized](#) that, although areas of disagreement exist, strategic stability is one area of possible cooperation between the two nations. Capturing this sentiment, the joint statement begins by recognizing that “the United States and Russia have demonstrated that, even in periods of tension, they are able to make progress on our shared goals of ensuring predictability in the strategic sphere, reducing the risk of armed conflicts and the threat of nuclear war.”

Statement on Nuclear War

Presidents Biden and Putin reaffirmed “the principle that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.” Presidents Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev had issued this [statement](#) in 1985, when they indicated that they were “conscious of the special responsibility of the USSR and the U.S. for maintaining peace.” By issuing this statement, Reagan and Gorbachev recognized the need to ease tensions that might lead to a conflict that could escalate to nuclear war.

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Some experts [have suggested](#) that a U.S.-Russian reaffirmation of this statement might help bolster international nonproliferation efforts by reducing the perceived value of nuclear weapons. On January 3, 2022, the five nuclear weapons states recognized by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (known as the P5) also [affirmed](#) this statement. Some have suggested that both the U.S.-Russian reaffirmation and the P5 confirmation might offset the impression that nuclear weapons states seem to view these weapons as a viable tool to address regional security challenges. The statement might also signal that the nuclear weapons states recognize the growing risks of nuclear escalation during crises.

Others, however, have questioned the value of the statement in the current security environment, noting that, in 1985, it was a reflection on the risk of large-scale nuclear war between the United States and Soviet Union. Moreover, some argue that a statement excluding the possible use of nuclear weapons in a regional conflict could undermine efforts to deter large-scale conventional attacks or even cyberattacks. Some have also questioned whether the United States might have to alter its employment policy or force posture if it acceded to a statement forswearing the value of nuclear weapons in regional conflicts.

The Biden Administration has not addressed questions about its rationale for reaffirming the statement. When it [issued](#) its Interim National Security Strategic Guidance in March 2021, it noted that the United States would “take steps to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy.” Reissuing this statement on nuclear war may contribute to that goal without foreshadowing any changes in the U.S. nuclear posture.

Strategic Stability Dialogue

Presidents Biden and Putin agreed that the United States and Russia would engage in “an integrated bilateral Strategic Stability Dialogue” that would “seek to lay the groundwork for future arms control and risk reduction measures.” The United States and Russia had engaged in similar talks in the past, and both Presidents supported their resumption prior to the summit. In his [press briefing](#) following the summit, President Biden noted that this dialogue would allow diplomats “to work on a mechanism that can lead to control of new and dangerous and sophisticated weapons that are coming on the scene now that reduce the times of response, that raise the prospects of accidental war.”

The U.S.-Russian strategic stability talks will likely not include other nations with nuclear weapons—such as China, France, and the United Kingdom—but could include discussions about other types of weapons beyond the long-range strategic weapons limited in New START. However, the two nations may hold different views on which topics they should discuss and different understandings of what constitutes strategic stability. In early September 2021, Bonnie Jenkins, the U.S. Under Secretary of State for International Security and Arms Control, [noted](#) that the United States would seek to capture new kinds of intercontinental-range nuclear delivery systems and nonstrategic nuclear weapons in the upcoming talks. Russia appears to favor a broader agenda; Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has [noted](#) that the discussions should include everything that “influences strategic stability,” including “nuclear and non-nuclear weapons, offensive and defensive weapons.” For Russia, this list includes ballistic missile defense, long-range strategic conventional arms, and weapons in space.

At the same time, with its mention of “arms control and risk reduction measures,” the joint statement also seems to indicate that the talks will not focus exclusively on negotiating a new treaty limiting nuclear weapons. They might also address transparency and risk reduction measures that could reduce the risk of inadvertent or intentional escalation to nuclear use during a crisis or conflict. The agenda could also include emerging technologies, operational practices, or doctrinal statements that might exacerbate tensions or complicate crisis management.

The United States and Russia held two rounds of talks in July and September 2021. After the second meeting, the delegations [announced](#) that they would “form two interagency expert working groups.” The first group would focus on “Principles and Objectives for Future Arms Control,” and the second would

address “Capabilities and Actions with Strategic Effects.” While some [press reports](#) stated that the talks were suspended after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the State Department offered a more nuanced answer, noting that there was no schedule for future talks.

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