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U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East: Historical, Recent Trends, and the FY2024 Background Request

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U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East: Historical, Recent Trends, and the FY2024 Background Request

This report is an overview of U.S. foreign assistance to the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). It includes a brief historical review of foreign aid levels, a description of specific country programs, and analysis of current foreign aid issues. It also provides analysis of the Administration's FY2024 budget request for State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Foreign Operations and Related Programs (SFOPS) appropriations in the MENA region.

The foreign aid data in this report are compiled by the Congressional Research Service from a number of resources, including USAID's *U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants* (also known as the "Greenbook"), State Department and USAID communications, executive branch agencies' notifications to Congress, and annual State Department and USAID Congressional Budget Justifications. For foreign aid terminology and abbreviations, see the Appendix.

Since 1946, the United States has provided an estimated total of \$372.6 billion (obligations in current dollars) in foreign assistance to the MENA region. For FY2024, overall aid requested for the MENA region amounts to \$7.57 billion, or about 11% of the State Department's International Affairs budget request. Compared with FY2022 actuals (not including emergency supplemental funding), for FY2024, the Administration proposed to reduce MENA funding by 3.5%. As in previous years, assistance for Israel, Egypt, and Jordan constitutes the majority of the Middle East funding request. The region also receives a sizable portion of annual humanitarian assistance appropriations, which are not included in the region-specific aid figures.

Amid resurgent conflict between Israelis and Palestinians in the West Bank, the President's FY2024 request seeks \$225 million in economic aid for the Palestinians and \$50 million to support the Nita M. Lowey Middle East Partnership for Peace Act of 2020. It also seeks \$33 million in non-lethal security and justice sector assistance for the Palestinian Authority (PA). The Taylor Force Act prohibits economic assistance that "directly benefits" the PA—subject to limited, specified exceptions—in response to continued PA payments "for acts of terrorism" against Israel. Reflecting democratic backsliding in Tunisia, the FY2024 budget request would decrease aid to Tunisia. President Kaïs Saïed's increasingly authoritarian rule has quashed Tunisia's nascent democratic system, established after Tunisians overthrew a longstanding authoritarian regime in 2011.

In order to more accurately compare the Administration's FY2024 foreign assistance request to previous years' appropriations, aid figures in this report (except where otherwise indicated) refer only to funding that is administered by the State Department or USAID and requested for individual countries or regional programs. While this represents the majority of U.S. assistance to the Middle East, several other sources of U.S. aid to the region exist, such as Transition Initiatives (TI) and the aforementioned humanitarian aid provided through the Food for Peace Act, Title II (FFP), International Disaster Assistance (IDA), and Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA) accounts. Other U.S. federal entities—such as the Departments of Defense, Commerce, and the Treasury, and the Millennium Challenge Corporation—administer additional types of assistance. Funding for such activities is generally not requested for individual countries and regions, and it is largely excluded here.

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Introduction

This report is an overview of U.S. foreign assistance to the Middle East and North Africa (MENA).¹ It includes a brief historical review of foreign aid levels, a description of specific country programs,² and analysis of current foreign aid issues. It also provides analysis of the Administration’s FY2024 budget request for State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Foreign Operations and Related Programs (SFOPS) appropriations in the MENA region.

Congress authorizes and appropriates foreign assistance and conducts oversight of executive agencies’ management of aid programs. As the largest regional recipient of U.S. economic and security assistance (see **Figure 1**), the Middle East is perennially a major focus of interest as Congress exercises these powers.

The foreign aid data in this memorandum are compiled by the Congressional Research Service from a number of resources, including USAID’s U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants (also known as the “Greenbook”), CRS communications with the State Department and USAID, executive branch agencies’ notifications to Congress, and the FY2024 State Department and USAID Congressional Budget Justifications (CBJs).³ For foreign aid terminology and abbreviations, see **Appendix**.

Regional Overview

U.S. bilateral assistance to MENA countries is intended to support long-standing U.S. foreign policy goals for the region, such as containing Iranian influence, countering terrorism, and promoting Israeli-Arab peace. It also aims to support the U.S. response to emerging challenges, such as U.S. strategic competition with Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC or China) and growing water scarcity in some parts of MENA. U.S. foreign assistance (from global or non-bilateral accounts) also is focused on ameliorating major humanitarian crises stemming from ongoing conflicts in Syria, Yemen, and elsewhere. Since 1946, the MENA region has received more U.S. foreign assistance than any other region (see **Figure 1**).⁴

¹ For the purposes of this report, the Middle East and North Africa region (MENA), or what the State Department calls “Near East” Affairs (NEA), is defined as an area stretching from Morocco in the west to the Persian/Arabian Gulf in the east, excluding Turkey. It comprises: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, West Bank/Gaza, and Yemen. The governments of Iran (since 1984) and Syria (since 1979) are prohibited under law from receiving U.S. bilateral aid because they are U.S.-designated State Sponsors of Terrorism. See CRS Report R43835, *State Sponsors of Acts of International Terrorism—Legislative Parameters: In Brief*, by Dianne E. Rennack. Since 2012, the United States has provided foreign assistance in Syria under special authorities that allow for assistance notwithstanding these terrorism related restrictions.


² While foreign assistance can take many forms, in most cases, U.S. foreign assistance is channeled through a U.S. government-managed economic or military program rather than a direct cash transfer to a recipient nation. In the MENA region, most U.S. military aid to Israel, Egypt, and Jordan finances the procurement of weapons systems and services from U.S. defense contractors. For general information on U.S. foreign assistance, see CRS Report R40213, *Foreign Assistance: An Introduction to U.S. Programs and Policy*, by Marian L. Lawson and Emily M. Morgenstern.

³ All references to the CBJ within this memorandum are sourced from U.S. Department of State, *Congressional Budget Justification: Foreign Operations and Related Programs, Fiscal Year 2024* and U.S. Department of State, *Congressional Budget Justification: Foreign Operations, Appendix 2, Fiscal Year 2024*.

⁴ Israel, Egypt, and Jordan combined have received \$248.7 billion (in current, or non-inflation-adjusted U.S. dollars) from 1946-2020. USAID, *U.S. Overseas Grants and Loans, July 1, 1945 through September 30, 2020*.

Figure 1. U.S. Foreign Aid by Region: FY1946-FY2020

current U.S. dollars in billions, obligations




Source: Funding administered by/appropriated to the State Department, USAID, and Defense Department and recorded, by law, in USAID's "Greenbook."

As in previous years, the United States provides the bulk of its foreign aid in the MENA region (mostly in the form of State Department-managed **military assistance**) to three countries: Israel, Egypt, and Jordan (see **Figure 2** below). U.S. military aid for Israel has been designed to maintain Israel's "qualitative military edge" (QME) over neighboring militaries. U.S. military aid to Egypt and Jordan (which have been at peace with Israel since 1979 and 1994, respectively) is designed to encourage continued Israeli-Arab cooperation on security issues while also facilitating interoperability between the United States and its Arab partners in the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility.

The United States provides **economic assistance** to some MENA countries with a focus on education, water security, governance, health, and economic growth. Public dissatisfaction over quality-of-life issues and lack of economic opportunities persists in many MENA countries; U.S. bilateral assistance is in part aimed at helping governments meet these needs. The *Arab Youth Survey*, conducted annually by the Dubai-based polling firm ASDA'A BCW, found in its 2023 edition that nearly half of young Arabs polled, particularly in North Africa and the Levant, had expressed a desire to emigrate.⁵

⁵ ASDA'A BCW, *Arab Youth Survey, 15th Annual Edition*. Findings available here: <https://arabyouthsurvey.com/en/findings/>.

Figure 2. U.S. Foreign Aid to MENA Countries: FY1946-FY2020
current U.S. dollars in billions, obligations




Source: Funding administered by/appropriated to the State Department, USAID, and Defense Department and recorded, by law, in USAID’s “Greenbook.” Totals for Israel do not include funding for missile defense.

The Administration’s FY2024 Aid Budget Request for the MENA Region

For FY2024, the Biden Administration seeks \$7.57 billion in bilateral aid to MENA,⁶ a figure identical to last year’s request (\$7.57 billion) and \$330 million below actual regional aid obligations in FY2022 (\$7.90 billion). Consistent with prior year requests, bilateral aid to Israel, Jordan, and Egypt accounts for 82% of President Biden’s total request for the MENA region (see **Figure 3**).

For FY2024, 69% of the President’s overall request for MENA is for Foreign Military Financing (FMF, \$5.28 billion), with about 70% of the FMF request allocated to Israel (\$3.3 billion) and Jordan (\$400 million) via multi-year Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs), subject to congressional appropriations. For FY2024, 27% of the President’s overall request for MENA is for the Economic Support Fund (ESF) (\$2.04 billion), of which more than half is requested for Jordan.

Figure 3. Israel, Jordan, and Egypt in the FY2024 Assistance Request for MENA



Source: CRS graphic, based on data from the State Department’s FY2024 Congressional Budget Justification for State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs.

⁶ This figure does not include emergency humanitarian assistance (e.g., aid for populations affected by conflicts in Yemen and Syria, or earthquake relief for the Turkey-Syria border region).

For the second year in a row, the Administration’s FMF request for Iraq is lower than the previous year’s; the FY2024 request is \$75.5 million compared to the FY2023 request of \$100 million. Ultimately, Congress appropriated \$250 million in FY2023 FMF for Iraq. Iraq also receives security assistance via Defense Department-administered funding accounts, such as the Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund (CTEF) and DOD’s Global Train and Equip program authorized under 10 U.S.C. §333.⁷

Table I. U.S. Bilateral Aid to MENA Countries: FY2021 - FY2024 Request

In millions of current U.S. dollars

Country/Territory	FY2021 Actual	FY2022 Actual	FY2023 Enacted	FY2024 Request
Algeria	1.30	2.85	n/a	2.80
Bahrain	3.70	4.73	n/a	4.45
Egypt	1,225.40*	1,468.65	1,425.00	1,437.00
Iraq	455.95	452.80	448.50	271.70
Israel	3,300.00	3,300.00	3,300.00	3,300.00
Jordan	1,650.00	1,650.06	1,650.00	1,450.00
Lebanon	258.32	315.30	112.500	282.00
Libya	23.60	17.80	n/a	15.95
Morocco	37.00	36.71	30.00	35.00
Oman	2.80	5.27	n/a	3.00
Syria	47.00	83.58	n/a	97.00
Tunisia	191.40	96.09	n/a	68.00
West Bank & Gaza	76.28	260.00	267.00	259.00
Yemen	17.60	44.87	n/a	42.55
Total	7,290.35	7,738.71	7,233.00	7,268.45

Source: Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS) Congressional Budget Justifications (FY2021-FY2024), and CRS calculations and rounding. This table does not include regional program aid. FY2023 enacted figures are derived from the Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying Division K for the FY2023 SFOPS Appropriations accompanying P.L. 117-328, the FY2023 Consolidated Appropriations Act. n/a/ – not available.

Notes: *The Biden Administration and Congress reprogrammed \$205 million in FY2021 FMF appropriated for Egypt due to human rights concerns.

Amid resurgent conflict between Israelis and Palestinians in the West Bank, the President’s FY2024 request seeks \$225 million in ESF for the Palestinians and \$50 million to support the Nita M. Lowey Middle East Partnership for Peace Act of 2020 (MEPPA; Division K, Title VIII of P.L. 116-260). It also seeks \$33 million (the same amount requested for FY2023, but \$9 million less than the eventual appropriation) in non-lethal International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) security and justice sector assistance for the Palestinian Authority (PA), with some media reports in early 2023 saying that the U.S. Security Coordinator for Israel and the PA plans to help recruit and train new PA units to address the West Bank crisis.⁸ The Taylor Force

⁷ U.S. Department of Defense, *Defense Budget Overview: Fiscal Year 2024 Budget Request*, March 2023.

⁸ Yoni Ben Menachem, “American-Israeli Military Coordination and the Possibility of Regional Escalation,” Jerusalem (continued...)

Act (TFA; enacted in 2018 as Division S, Title X of P.L. 115-141) prohibits ESF assistance that “directly benefits” the PA—subject to limited, specified exceptions—in response to continued PA payments “for acts of terrorism” against Israel.

Reflecting democratic backsliding in Tunisia, the FY2024 budget request would decrease aid to Tunisia, proposing \$45 million in FMF (down from \$60 million allocated in FY2022), \$4 million in INCLE (down from \$6 million), and \$14.5 million in economic assistance (all ESF, compared to \$22.5 million in combined ESF and Development Assistance or DA). The FY2024 CBJ separately proposes \$113 million in FMF for “Emerging Global Priorities,” citing the potential to allocate additional funds for Tunisia if it “shows signs of a return to democratic governance.”

Overall, the Administration asserts that its FY2024 request would support “efforts to advance a stable and prosperous Middle East and North Africa” as the MENA region is beset by significant security and economic challenges, such as armed conflict, economic crises, climate change, and demographic pressures. One response to these challenges devised by the Administration is a proposed Middle East and North Africa Opportunity Fund (\$90 million in ESF) to “enable the United States to respond to unforeseen openings and support emerging opportunities.”⁹ The proposal resembles similar requests by the Obama Administration for a flexible regional spending account in the aftermath of the 2011 “Arab Spring.”

Country Profiles

Israel¹⁰

Israel is the largest cumulative recipient of U.S. foreign assistance since World War II. To date, the United States has provided Israel \$158 billion (current, or non-inflation-adjusted, dollars) in bilateral assistance and missile defense funding. Almost all U.S. bilateral aid to Israel is in the form of military assistance, although in the past Israel also received significant economic assistance.

In 2016, the U.S. and Israeli governments signed their third 10-year Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on military aid, covering FY2019 to FY2028. Under the terms of the MOU, the United States pledged to provide—subject to congressional appropriation—\$38 billion in military aid (\$33 billion in FMF grants plus \$5 billion in missile defense appropriations) to Israel. Section 1273 of the FY2021 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, P.L. 116-283) authorizes “not less than” \$3.3 billion in annual FMF to Israel through 2028 per the terms of the current MOU. Appropriators have matched that authorization level each year since its passage.

Center for Public Affairs, March 9, 2023, at <https://jcpa.org/american-israeli-military-coordination-and-the-possibility-of-regional-escalation/>; Barak Ravid, “Israeli-Palestinian showdown at UN averted after U.S. mediation,” *Axios*, February 19, 2023, at <https://www.axios.com/2023/02/19/israel-palestinian-un-security-council-settlements-blinken>.

⁹ U.S. Department of State, *Congressional Budget Justification: Foreign Operations Appendix 2, Fiscal Year 2024*, p. 123.

¹⁰ For more background, please see CRS Report RL33222, *U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel*, by Jeremy M. Sharp.

Table 2. U.S. Bilateral Aid to Israel: FY2020-FY2024 Request

In millions of current U.S. dollars

Account	FY2020 Actual	FY2021 Actual	FY2022 Actual	FY2023 Enacted	FY2024 Request
FMF	3,300.00	3,300.00	3,300.00	3,300.00	3,300.00
Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA)	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00
Total	3,305.00	3,305.00	3,305.00	3,305.00	3,305.00

Source: Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Congressional Budget Justifications (FY2021-FY2024) and CRS calculations and rounding.

For FY2024, the Biden Administration is requesting \$3.3 billion in FMF for Israel. According to the FY2024 CBJ:

The enduring U.S. commitment to Israel’s security is a cornerstone of U.S. policy in the Middle East. Continuing robust levels of bilateral U.S. security assistance to Israel acknowledges strong bilateral ties and signals an enduring U.S. commitment to Israel’s security. This commitment to Israel’s security is manifest in the United States’ robust FMF program, in helping maintain Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge, and in cutting-edge cooperation on defense technology. FY 2024 funds will support Israel’s continued defense modernization and provide for the acquisition of U.S.-origin defense equipment ranging from ammunition to advanced weapons systems and training.¹¹

The Administration also is seeking \$5 million in Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA) to support the continued relocation and integration of Jewish migrants to Israel, including those from the former Soviet Union, Near East, and Ethiopia.

Jordan¹²

The United States has provided economic and military aid to Jordan since 1951 and 1957, respectively. Total bilateral U.S. aid (overseen by the Departments of State and Defense) to Jordan through FY2020 amounted to approximately \$26.4 billion. Jordan also has received over \$1.87 billion in additional military aid since FY2015, channeled through the Defense Department’s various security assistance accounts. U.S. assistance to Jordan accounts for over 40% of the total amount of official aid the kingdom receives annually.

In 2022, the United States and Jordan signed their fourth MOU regarding U.S. foreign aid to Jordan. The seven-year agreement (FY2023-FY2029), subject to congressional appropriations, commits the Administration to seeking a total of \$1.45 billion in annual economic and military aid for Jordan. When compared to the previous MOU, this fourth MOU provides 13.7% more in annual aid and lasts for seven fiscal years instead of five. It represents the largest multi-year U.S. foreign assistance commitment (\$10.15 billion over seven years) to the kingdom. Congress has appropriated between \$1.5 billion and \$1.65 billion in total annual aid to Jordan since FY2018.

¹¹ U.S. Department of State, *Congressional Budget Justification: Foreign Operations Appendix 2, Fiscal Year 2024*, p. 430.

¹² For more background, please see CRS Report RL33546, *Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations*, by Jeremy M. Sharp.

Table 3. U.S. Bilateral Aid to Jordan: FY2020-FY2024 Request

In millions of current U.S. dollars

Account	FY2020 Actual	FY2021 Actual	FY2022 Actual	FY2023 Enacted	FY2024 Request
DA	—	85.00	—	—	—
ESF	1,082.40	1,122.40	1,203.40	1,210.80	1,035.80
FMF	425.00	425.00	425.00	425.00	400.00
International Military Education and Training (IMET)	4.00	4.00	1.95	3.80	3.80
INCLE	—	—	2.50	—	2.50
Non-Proliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR)	13.60	13.60	13.20	10.40	5.90
Global Health Programs (GHP)	—	—	4.00	—	2.00
Total	1,525.00	1,650.00	1,650.05	1,650.00	1,450.00

Sources: Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Congressional Budget Justifications (FY2021-FY2024) and CRS calculations and rounding.

For FY2024, the Biden Administration is seeking a total of \$1.45 billion in assistance for Jordan in line with the MOU. According to the FY2024 CBJ, U.S. economic aid to Jordan will “advance the Government of Jordan’s (GoJ) economic reform agenda, mitigate the impacts of refugees from neighboring countries, and provide direct budget support to the GoJ for non-military expenditures, thereby decreasing the GoJ’s budget shortfalls.”¹³

Egypt¹⁴

Since 1946, the United States has provided Egypt with over \$87 billion in bilateral foreign aid (calculated in historical dollars—not adjusted for inflation), with military and economic assistance increasing significantly after 1979. Annual appropriations legislation have included several conditions governing the release of these funds. Successive U.S. Administrations have justified aid to Egypt as an investment in regional stability, built primarily on long-running cooperation with the Egyptian military and on sustaining the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. All U.S. military aid to Egypt finances the procurement of weapons systems and services from U.S. defense contractors.

¹³ U.S. Department of State, *Congressional Budget Justification: Foreign Operations Appendix 2*, Fiscal Year 2024, p. 286.

¹⁴ For more background, please see CRS Report RL33003, *Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations*, by Jeremy M. Sharp.

Table 4. U.S. Bilateral Aid to Egypt: FY2020-FY2024 Request

In millions of current U.S. dollars

Account	FY2020 Actual	FY2021 Actual	FY2022 Actual	FY2023 Enacted	FY2024 Request
FMF	1,170.00	1,095.00	1,300.00	1,300.00	1,300.00
ESF	125.00	125.00	160.00	125.00	125.00
INCLE	2.00	0.35	—	—	—
NADR	3.50	3.25	3.65	3.50	3.50
IMET	—	1.80	—	1.80	2.00
GHP	—	—	5.00	6.00	6.00
Total	1,300.50	1,225.40	1,468.65	1,436.30	1,436.50

Source: Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs Congressional Budget Justifications (FY2021-FY2024) and CRS calculations and rounding.

For FY2024, the Biden Administration has requested \$1.4 billion in bilateral assistance for Egypt, the same amount Congress appropriated the previous year. Nearly all of the U.S. funds for Egypt come from the FMF account. According to the FY2024 CBJ, “FMF will support the modernization and sustainment of Egyptian forces to bolster Egypt’s efforts to defeat extremist groups” and “will also support Egypt’s interoperability with U.S. and regional security partners, including for air and missile defense.”¹⁵

Over the past two years, the Biden Administration and Congress have reprogrammed a total of **\$335 million in FMF** originally designated for Egypt based on relevant provisions in appropriations law that withhold the obligation of a portion of FMF until the State Department certifies progress on democracy and human rights (see “**Conditioning U.S. Foreign Assistance to Egypt**” below)

Iraq¹⁶

The State Department and USAID fund security, economic, stabilization, and democracy programs in Iraq (see **Table 5** below) that are intended to complement security assistance provided through FMF and, as previously mentioned, Defense Department CTEF and Global Train and Equip (10 U.S.C. §333) programs. The Biden Administration is requesting \$271.2 million for Iraq programs for FY2024 and notified Congress in 2022 of planned obligations for multiyear U.S. initiatives to support Iraqi election authorities, improve service delivery, strengthen provincial governance, make public finances more transparent, and support civil society. Among them, the USAID-administered Iraq Governance and Performance Accountability (IGPA/*Takamul*) Project seeks to assist Iraq in combatting corruption and improving service delivery, and the *Tahfeez* program seeks to support private sector activity and entrepreneurship. The *Takamul* project is set to continue through 2023, and *Tahfeez* is set to continue into 2024. The United States was the top humanitarian funding donor for Iraq in 2022, providing more than \$251 million in humanitarian aid for Iraq in FY2022 (see “**Funding for Complex Humanitarian Crises**” below).

¹⁵ U.S. Department of State, *Congressional Budget Justification: Foreign Operations Appendix 2, Fiscal Year 2024*, p. 430.

¹⁶ Prepared by Christopher M. Blanchard, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs. For additional background, see CRS InFocus CRS In Focus IF10404, *Iraq*, by Christopher M. Blanchard.

The State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL) administers programs focused on rule of law, religious freedom, justice sector reform, and civil society strengthening. The State Department’s Near Eastern Affairs (NEA) Bureau administers programs focused on commercial law reform, climate and clean energy, and support to the United Nations Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da’esh/Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (UNITAD). The bureau also oversees U.S. support to Iraq-based higher education institutions, including the American University in Iraq-Sulaimani (in Arabic *Suleimaniyah*), which has enrolled Afghan students relocated to Iraq following the 2021 U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan.

Table 5. U.S. Bilateral Aid to Iraq: FY2020-FY2024 Request

In millions of current U.S. dollars

Account	FY2020 Actual	FY2021 Actual	FY2022 Actual	FY2023 Enacted	FY2024 Request
FMF	250.00	250.00	250.00	250.00	75.50
ESF	150.00	150.00	150.00	150.00	150.00
INCLE	5.60	5.60	1.20	—	—
NADR	47.51	47.51	49.35	47.50	44.50
IMET	1.00	1.00	0.25	1.00	1.20
Total	454.11	454.11	450.80	448.50	271.20

Source: Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs Congressional Budget Justifications (FY2021-FY2024), FY2023 Joint Explanatory Statement for H.R.2617, and CRS calculations and rounding.

Congress has authorized DOD counter-IS train and equip programs for Iraq through 2023 and has appropriated related funds available through September 2024, including aid to the Kurdistan Regional Government’s (KRG) Ministry of Peshmerga Regional Guard Brigade forces. Since 2014, Congress has appropriated more than \$7.7 billion for counter-ISIS train and equip programs for Iraqis, and DOD has allocated 10 U.S.C. §333 funds for Iraqi Security Forces since 2021. President Biden has requested \$241.95 million in counter-IS train and equip funds for Iraq in FY2024, including funds to aid the Iraqi military, Counter Terrorism Service, and selected Ministry of Interior forces. Of the request, \$163.55 million would support KRG peshmerga stipends through FY2025 and provide new equipment and sustainment. U.S. assistance to KRG security forces is provided with the Iraqi government’s approval.

Regional Program Aid

In addition to bilateral aid provided to specific countries, the United States provides aid to NEA countries through regional programs, including:

The Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI)


The Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) is a State Department-managed program funded through the ESF account. The George W. Bush Administration launched MEPI in 2002 in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks to bolster civil society and promote democratic reform in the MENA region. MEPI provides small grants and scholarships to civil society groups and students in certain MENA countries. MEPI also funds training and exchange programs for political and social activists. Congress, through the appropriations process, has directed that a certain amount of annual ESF for MEPI support scholarships for underserved

communities and qualified students at select U.S.-accredited universities with an emphasis on building civic engagement for future leaders.

Over the life of the now 20-year-old program, Congress has appropriated over \$1.1 billion in ESF for MEPI-supported programs. MEPI programs include: Tomorrow’s Leaders, Leadership Development Fellowship, Student Leaders, Regional Open Government Partnership Reforms, Local Grants, Alumni Connection, MENA Media Fund, Western Sahara civil society capacity building,¹⁷ Commercial Law Development Program, and Program Support.¹⁸ For FY2024, the Biden Administration is requesting \$27.4 million in ESF for MEPI.

Figure 4. ESF Appropriations for MEPI: FY2003-FY2023

In millions of current U.S. dollars



Source: Congress.gov and Joint Explanatory Statements accompanying omnibus legislation.

Middle East Regional Cooperation (MERC)

Middle East Regional Cooperation (MERC) is a USAID-managed program funded through ESF. MERC supports scientific cooperation between Israelis and Arabs. Established in 1981, MERC was designed to encourage cooperation between Egyptian and Israeli scientists. Today, MERC is an open-topic, peer-reviewed competitive grants program that funds joint Israeli-Arab research on topics relevant to regional development in the water, agriculture, environment, and health sectors. According to USAID, each MERC-funded project includes at least one partner institution in Israel working with counterparts from one or more MENA countries/territories (e.g., Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, the West Bank, and Gaza).¹⁹ MERC funding also supports the

¹⁷ For the past several fiscal years, appropriators have directed in SFOPS joint explanatory statements accompanying the omnibus appropriations bill that the MEPI program include assistance for participants from the Western Sahara. For a sample State Department MEPI grant solicitation related to Western Sahara, see <https://www.highergov.com/grant-opportunity/promoting-economic-opportunity-in-the-western-sahara-306217/>.

¹⁸ U.S. Department of State, Congressional Notification to Congress, February 17, 2023.

¹⁹ CRS correspondence with USAID, July 2023.

monitoring and evaluation of each joint program. Throughout the life of the program, the United States has provided over \$230 million in funding for MERC.²⁰

In FY2023, appropriators allocated \$8 million for MERC.²¹ For FY2024, the Biden Administration is requesting \$5 million in ESF for the MERC program.

Middle East Regional (MER)

Middle East Regional (MER) is a USAID-managed program funded through the ESF and DA accounts. MER supports programs that work in multiple countries on issues such as climate change, water and food security, state fragility, democracy and governance, and inclusive economic growth. According to the FY2024 CBJ, “MER funding will also support ongoing and new activities that serve as a counter to the influence the PRC in the NEA region.” The FY2024 CBJ also notes that funding will “complement bilateral foreign assistance.”²² For FY2024, the President is requesting \$8 million for MER.

Middle East Multilaterals (MEM)

Middle East Multilaterals (MEM) is a U.S. State Department-managed program funded through ESF that supports initiatives aimed at promoting greater technical cooperation between Arabs and Israelis on issues such as water scarcity, environmental protection, and renewable energy. ESF allocations for MEM, which typically are less than \$1 million per year (\$500k requested for FY2024), support the Middle East Desalination Research Center (MEDRC), an Oman-based research center founded in 1996 as part of the Middle East Multilateral peace process. MEDRC is funded by the Sultanate of Oman and other international partners, such as Sweden, the Netherlands, Japan, Germany, and the Republic of Korea. According to the FY2024 CBJ, “MEDRC has established a 25-year track record of sustained Arab-Israeli cooperation, building trust between the core parties to sustain a constructive dialogue on addressing water scarcity. MEDRC is one of two international institutions housed in the Arab world of which Israel is a member and can work with Arab partners.”²³

Middle East Partnership for Peace (MEPPA)

The Administration established two separate funds in 2021 under the Nita M. Lowey Middle East Partnership for Peace Act of 2020 (MEPPA, Div. K, Title VIII of P.L. 116-260): one linked with USAID to support Israeli-Palestinian reconciliation and general cooperation (including some cooperation aimed at developing the Palestinian economy), and one linked with the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) to strengthen the Palestinian financial sector (including via Israeli-Palestinian and U.S.-Palestinian economic cooperation).²⁴ MEPPA authorized the total appropriation of \$250 million (\$50 million per year) to be used between the two funds from FY2021 to FY2025. Congress has appropriated the authorized amounts for the three years spanning FY2021 to FY2023, and the Administration has requested an additional \$50 million for FY2024. In April 2023, the Administration notified Congress of its intent to obligate

²⁰ For a list of selected MERC-funded research projects, see <https://www.usaid.gov/where-we-work/middle-east/merc/research-projects>.

²¹ Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying P.L. 117-328, the FY2023 Consolidated Appropriations Act.

²² U.S. Department of State, *Congressional Budget Justification: Foreign Operations Appendix 2, Fiscal Year 2024*, pp. 244-245.

²³ U.S. Department of State, *Congressional Budget Justification: Foreign Operations Appendix 2, Fiscal Year 2024*, p. 295.

²⁴ Information portal describing funds available at <https://www.usaid.gov/west-bank-and-gaza/meppa>.

the \$50 million of FY2022 ESF for MEPPA, with \$41 million allocated for the USAID-linked fund and \$9 million for the DFC-linked fund.²⁵

Near East Regional Democracy (NERD)

The main foreign assistance channel through which the United States has supported civil society and human rights in Iran is State Department-administered Near East Regional Democracy (NERD) funding. NERD was created in FY2009 as a “line item for Iran democracy” but was not (and is still not) technically Iran-specific, reportedly because, in the words of one analyst, “congressional funding for democracy promotion was seen in Tehran as an attempt at regime change.”²⁶ For FY2024, the Biden Administration requested \$65 million for NERD (\$10 million more than the FY2022 actual level and FY2023 requested level of \$55 million) to “foster a vibrant civil society, increase the free flow of information, and promote the exercise of human rights,” including at least \$16.75 million for internet freedom.²⁷ Due to U.S.-Iran hostility and the Iranian government’s view of NERD as a means of financing regime change, programs are carried out through “third-country training” as well as “online training and media content.”²⁸ The U.S. government “does not publicize NERD activities, grantees, or beneficiaries due to the security risks posed by the Iranian government,” though at least one grantee has talked publicly about having received NERD funding.²⁹ Between FY2009 and FY2023, Congress appropriated over \$600 million for NERD.

Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP)

The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) is a State Department-led interagency initiative aimed at strengthening the ability of countries in North and West Africa to prevent and respond to terrorist threats. TSCTP was established in 2005 and involves cooperation between the United States and multiple partner countries, including four within the jurisdiction of the State Department’s NEA Bureau: Algeria, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia.

TSCTP is funded under multiple SFOPS accounts, including DA; ESF; Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs-Antiterrorism (NADR-ATA); INCLE; and Peacekeeping Operations (PKO). The NEA countries are not major recipients of TSCTP funding, as the program primarily focuses on sub-Saharan African countries. For FY2024, the Biden Administration is proposing possible NADR-ATA funds for TSCTP NEA countries. The Administration also is requesting \$33.4 million in PKO funds for TSCTP—the primary vehicle for military aid under the program—along with other funding for sub-Saharan African countries.

²⁵ USAID, FY2023 Congressional Notification #107, April 11, 2023. The allocation for the FY2021 funding was \$46.5 million to the USAID-linked fund and \$3.5 million to the DFC-linked fund. USAID, FY2022 Congressional Notification #43, January 20, 2022.

²⁶ Congressman Mark Kirk, “The courage of our own convictions,” Remarks at the U.S. Institute of Peace, November 4, 2009; Shahram Akbarzadeh, “Democracy promotion versus engagement with Iran,” *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, vol. 41, no. 3 (2011), p. 479. See also <https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/112th-congress-2011-2012/costestimate/hr19051.pdf>.

²⁷ U.S. Department of State, *Congressional Budget Justification: Foreign Operations Appendix 2, Fiscal Year 2024*, p. 296.

²⁸ “Iran’s top intelligence bodies issue joint explanatory statement on riots,” *PressTV*, October 30, 2022; *Congressional Budget Justification*.

²⁹ Seth Binder et al, *Back to Business as Usual: President Biden’s First Foreign Affairs Budget for the Middle East and North Africa*, POMED, September 2021; Testimony of Roya Hakakian, in U.S. Congress, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, *Women Leaders Countering Authoritarianism*, hearing, 117th Cong., 2nd sess., September 21, 2022.

Funding for Complex Humanitarian Crises

Over the last decade, the MENA region has experienced several of the world's most challenging humanitarian crises. The United States has devoted foreign assistance resources toward the crises stemming from ongoing conflicts in Syria, Yemen, and elsewhere. Since 2010, the United States has provided over **\$28.3 billion** in humanitarian response funding to the Middle East.³⁰


- The United States is the largest donor of humanitarian assistance to the **Syria crisis** and since FY2012 has allocated \$16.7 billion to meet humanitarian needs, using existing funding from global humanitarian accounts and some reprogrammed funding.
- According to the United Nations, **Yemen's humanitarian crisis** is one of the worst in the world, with nearly 75% of Yemen's population needing some form of assistance. The United States and Saudi Arabia are among the largest donors to annual U.N. appeals for aid for Yemen.³¹ Since 2010, the United States has provided over \$6 billion in humanitarian aid for Yemen. Most of these funds are provided through the USAID/BHA to support World Food Programme (WFP) in Yemen.
- The United States has been one of the largest donors of humanitarian assistance in **Iraq** since the Iraqi government's **confrontation with the Islamic State**. The United States has provided \$3.5 billion in humanitarian aid in Iraq for food, improved sanitation and hygiene, and other assistance for displaced and vulnerable communities since 2014.
- In **Lebanon**, the ongoing Syrian refugee crisis coupled with a historic economic collapse beginning in 2019 has driven an increase in humanitarian needs among vulnerable populations. The United States has provided over \$1 billion in humanitarian funding to Lebanon since FY2020.

³⁰ CRS calculation based on USAID Complex Emergency Factsheets. Funding in current dollars.

³¹ Reuters, "Donors pledge \$1.2 bln of \$4.3 bln sought for Yemen aid plan," February 27, 2023.

Figure 5. U.S. Humanitarian Funding to Select Middle East Crises

In millions of current U.S. dollars



Source: USAID Complex Emergency Fact Sheets, FY2010-FY2023.

The State Department and USAID provide humanitarian assistance through implementing partners, including international aid organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and for-profit contractors. Humanitarian assistance is primarily managed by USAID/BHA and the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (State/PRM) using “global accounts” (rather than bilateral assistance), such as International Disaster Assistance (IDA), Food for Peace (FFP), and MRA.

Select MENA Foreign Aid Issues

The Palestinians: Aid Conditionality and Security Sector Assistance³²

Congress has the power to appropriate, condition, or prohibit various forms of U.S. funding for the Palestinians, including bilateral aid and humanitarian contributions to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA).

The Biden Administration has resumed some economic development, security, and humanitarian aid for Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. In 2019, the Trump Administration suspended all U.S. aid to the Palestinians,³³ after a number of measures by the Administration and Congress in 2018 to halt or limit various types of aid.³⁴ Some of these measures reflected Trump Administration policies that unsuccessfully sought to compel Palestinian leaders to accept U.S.

³² Prepared by Jim Zanotti, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs, x7-1441. For more information, see CRS Report RL34074, *The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations*, by Jim Zanotti.

³³ For more information on this development and subsequent legislative amendments that facilitated renewed congressional appropriations of bilateral aid for the West Bank and Gaza starting in FY2020, see archived CRS Report R46274, *The Palestinians and Amendments to the Anti-Terrorism Act: U.S. Aid and Personal Jurisdiction*, by Jim Zanotti and Jennifer K. Elsea.

³⁴ Archived CRS Report RS22967, *U.S. Foreign Aid to the Palestinians*, by Jim Zanotti.

and Israeli negotiating demands. Other measures, such as the Taylor Force Act, attracted bipartisan support.

The Taylor Force Act and Other Conditions on Aid to Palestinians


The TFA seeks to discourage certain Palestine Liberation Organization/Palestinian Authority (PLO/PA) payments made to Palestinians (and/or their families) who are imprisoned for or accused of terrorism by Israel. During the legislative process for the TFA, some Members of Congress argued that these PLO/PA payments provide incentives for Palestinians to commit terrorist acts.

For so long as these PLO/PA payments continue, the TFA will prohibit most ESF that “directly benefits” the PA, with specific exceptions for the East Jerusalem Hospital Network and certain amounts for wastewater projects and vaccination programs. The TFA does not further define what constitutes a direct benefit. The Biden Administration has said that any provision of aid to the Palestinians will comply with the TFA.

Beyond the TFA, Congress routinely attaches a number of conditions to and reporting requirements on aid to the Palestinians in annual appropriations language.³⁵ These include restrictions on aid for a power-sharing PA government that includes Hamas as a member, or that results from an agreement with Hamas and over which Hamas exercises “undue influence.” This general restriction would only be lifted if the President certifies that the PA government, including all ministers, has “publicly accepted and is complying with” the following two principles: (1) recognition of “the Jewish state of Israel’s right to exist” and (2) acceptance of previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements.³⁶

Under the Biden Administration, total bilateral U.S. aid to the Palestinians has approached pre-Trump Administration levels (see **Figure 6**), subject to the TFA’s limitations on funding that directly benefits the PA. For FY2022 and FY2023, the Administration requested \$185 million in ESF and \$33 million in INCLE for the Palestinians. In both years, Congress appropriated funds beyond the requested amounts. For FY2024, the Administration increased the ESF request to \$225 million, which was the amount of ESF appropriated for FY2023.

Figure 6. U.S. Bilateral Aid to the Palestinians, FY2014-FY2024 Request
(appropriations)



Sources: U.S. State Department and USAID, adapted by CRS.

³⁵ See, for example, Sections 7037-7040, and 7041(l) of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 (P.L. 117-328).

³⁶ P.L. 117-328, §7040(f), referencing Section 620K of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended by the Palestinian Anti-Terrorism Act of 2006 (PATA, P.L. 109-446). If the PA government is “ Hamas-controlled,” PATA applies additional conditions, limitations, and restrictions on aid.

Notes: All amounts are approximate. Some amounts have been appropriated but not obligated. Amounts for FY2024 have been requested but not appropriated. OCO=Overseas Contingency Operations.

ESF is the main channel for economic development, civil society, and humanitarian assistance through NGO implementing partners in the West Bank and Gaza. In its FY2024 CBJ for ESF assistance for the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the State Department said:

Funds will support programs that preserve the viability of a two-state solution, while working to advance equal measures of freedom, security, dignity, and prosperity for both Palestinians and Israelis. Palestinians are grappling with severe poverty, crippling unemployment, and chronic underdevelopment – particularly in Gaza – while facing an uncertain political future and rising violence. In this fragile context, assistance programs seek to reduce the likelihood of destabilization by creating new economic and civic opportunities, addressing gaps in community level service delivery and effective local governance, and providing relief and resilience support to vulnerable populations.³⁷

A general increase in Israeli-Palestinian violence has been associated with increased U.S. policy attention to non-lethal INCLE security and justice sector assistance for the PA in the West Bank since 2022.³⁸ In the FY2024 CBJ, the State Department said:

Assistance may include technical support, training and mentoring, institutional development, cross-sectoral capacity building, and where necessary, limited construction, refurbishment, and equipment support to the Ministry of Interior, Palestinian Civil Police, and other security forces, as appropriate.³⁹

According to one media report, Secretary of State Antony Blinken encouraged PA President Mahmoud Abbas in January 2023 to implement a security plan supported by the U.S. Security Coordinator for Israel and the PA (USSC), Lieutenant General Michael Fenzel.⁴⁰ The plan reportedly focuses on helping PA security forces regain control in the northern West Bank cities of Jenin and Nablus, including the training of a special PA force. PA officials reportedly expressed reservations about the plan, partly because of concerns that it might not reduce Israeli incursions into West Bank cities or include other provisions calculated to attract Palestinian public support.⁴¹ Nevertheless, the PA reportedly agreed in February to start implementing the USSC security plan,⁴² which one source has said would involve “the recruitment and training of thousands of Palestinian security personnel to be deployed in the northern West Bank.”⁴³ It is unclear whether the status of the USSC plan might change in light of an escalation of violence during the summer of 2023. Israeli military activity in and around Jenin has occasionally reached levels not seen

³⁷ U.S. Department of State, *Congressional Budget Justification: Foreign Operations Appendix 2, Fiscal Year 2024*, p. 292.

³⁸ U.S. Department of State, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas After Their Meeting,” January 31, 2023. See also CRS Report R44245, *Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations*, by Jim Zanotti.

³⁹ U.S. Department of State, *Congressional Budget Justification: Foreign Operations Appendix 2, Fiscal Year 2024*, p. 360.

⁴⁰ Barak Ravid, “Scoop: Blinken pressed Abbas to accept U.S. security plan for Jenin,” *Axios*, February 1, 2023. For background on the USSC, whose office oversees a multilateral mission based in Jerusalem, see CRS Report RL34074, *The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations*, by Jim Zanotti.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁴² Barak Ravid, “Israeli-Palestinian showdown at UN averted after U.S. mediation,” *Axios*, February 19, 2023.

⁴³ Yoni Ben Menachem, “American-Israeli Military Coordination and the Possibility of Regional Escalation,” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, March 9, 2023.

since the 2000–2005 Palestinian second *intifada* (uprising), and according to one media report, PA security forces have largely “lost control of the area.”⁴⁴

U.S. Aid to Tunisia Amid Democratic Backsliding⁴⁵

President Kaïs Saïed’s increasingly authoritarian rule has quashed Tunisia’s nascent democratic system, which was established after Tunisians overthrew a longstanding authoritarian regime in 2011. Elected in 2019 on a populist outsider campaign, Saïed has dismantled institutional checks and balances, cracked down on civil liberties, and encouraged a wave of arrests targeting his political adversaries. Meanwhile, Tunisia’s persistent economic challenges have continued to deepen in 2023 amid severe drought and the ripple effects of the Russia-Ukraine war.

Tunisia’s turn toward authoritarianism raises challenges for U.S. policymakers, as a rare former democratic bright spot in MENA and as a U.S. regional security partner and designated Major Non-NATO Ally. In March 2023, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Barbara Leaf expressed “enormous concern about where Tunisia is headed, guided by this president.”⁴⁶ U.S. officials may be seeking to balance multiple policy goals, including:

1. support for democratic principles,
2. partnership with Tunisian security forces to counter regional security threats,
3. competition against influence from Russia and China in North Africa, and
4. efforts to prevent Tunisia’s economic crisis from spiraling into greater instability.

Background on U.S. Aid to Tunisia Post-2011

U.S. aid for Tunisia grew significantly after 2011, particularly following adoption of the 2014 constitution and the 2015 elections.⁴⁷ From FY2016 to FY2021, Congress specified a minimum floor of aid for Tunisia in annual appropriations legislation—\$241 million in FY2021, including \$50 million in prior-year funds (under P.L. 116-260 and the accompanying explanatory statement). This had the practical effect of ensuring a certain level of State Department- and USAID-administered economic and security assistance for Tunisia in the context of competing regional and global priorities. Tunisia has generally received additional assistance through regional and global programs, along with security cooperation administered by the Department of Defense (DOD).

The Biden Administration has proposed to reduce economic and security aid to Tunisia in FY2024, compared to FY2022 allocations (latest available), while maintaining some security cooperation (**Table 6** below). The Administration’s budget proposal emphasizes the importance of continued FMF for Tunisia’s armed forces, “who remain on the front lines of the fight against [the Islamic State] and other terrorist groups and the instability emanating from Libya and serve as an important apolitical institution in Tunisian society.”⁴⁸ Some observers and Members of Congress dispute that the military remains apolitical, and some have called for restrictions on military aid and/or aid to security forces under the authority of the Ministry of Interior (ongoing via the INCLE and NADR accounts).⁴⁹

⁴⁴ Ben Caspit, “Can Israel’s operation in Jenin restore IDF deterrence in West Bank?” *Al-Monitor*, July 4, 2023.

⁴⁵ Prepared by Alexis Arieff, Specialist in African Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade Division.

⁴⁶ Reuters, “US says Tunisia president weakened checks and balances,” March 23, 2023.

⁴⁷ See CRS Report R46796, *Congress and the Middle East, 2011–2020: Selected Case Studies*, coordinated by Christopher M. Blanchard.

⁴⁸ U.S. Department of State, *Congressional Budget Justification: Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 2024*, p. 161.

⁴⁹ E.g., Senator Chris Murphy, “Looking at Tunisia from all Angles,” remarks at the U.S. Institute for Peace (USIP), April 11, 2023; Sharan Grewal, “Expert Q&A – Executing Orders or Eroding Democracy? The Role of Tunisia’s Military in Kaïs Saïed’s Power Grab,” by Zachary White, POMED, December 1, 2021; and Al Jazeera, “Lawmakers, rights groups urge US to condition aid to Tunisia,” April 27, 2022.

Bilateral economic assistance has supported good governance, economic growth, education, “social assistance” for needy households, and climate adaptation programs, among others. The Administration’s FY2024 budget request would decrease economic assistance to \$14.5 million from \$22.5 million in FY2022. The largest proposed reductions, by program area, include clean energy (-\$5.0 million), higher education (-\$2.0 million), private sector productivity (-\$1.7 million), and civil society (-\$1.2 million).⁵⁰ Funds for “political competition and consensus building” would increase (+\$1.9 million). The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) approved in 2021—but has not signed to date—a \$499 million aid compact to strengthen Tunisia’s transportation, trade, and water sectors.⁵¹

Table 6. U.S. Bilateral Aid to Tunisia: FY2020-FY2024 Request

In millions of current U.S. dollars

Account	FY2020 Actual	FY2021 Actual	FY2022 Actual	FY2023 Request	FY2024 Request
FMF	85.00	85.00	60.00	45.00	45.00
ESF (including supplemental appropriations)	45.00	42.80	12.00	45.00	14.50
INCLE	13.00	13.00	6.00	12.00	4.00
NADR	6.10	6.10	6.10	2.00	2.50
IMET	2.30	2.30	1.49	2.00	2.30
DA	40.00	45.0	10.50	0.00	0.00
Total	191.40*	194.20*	96.09	106.00	68.30

Source: Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Congressional Budget Justifications (FY2022-FY2024). Allocations by year of appropriation. Table excludes funds administered on a regional or global basis, or by federal entities other than the State Department and USAID.

Note: * From FY2019 through FY2021, Congress annually directed an additional \$50 million in prior-year funds for Tunisia.

Since FY2022, Congress has not set a minimum floor of aid to Tunisia in annual appropriations legislation, reflecting uncertainty about the country’s trajectory and U.S. support. The FY2022 and FY2023 omnibus appropriations acts introduced new notification requirements for planned aid to Tunisia, along with reporting requirements related to Tunisia’s economic reforms and the behavior of its state security forces.⁵²

In the 118th Congress, S. 2006, as reported by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, would withhold a portion of U.S. aid for Tunisia until the Secretary of State certifies that Tunisia is meeting certain benchmarks related to ending political repression. The bill would also authorize the appropriation of \$100 million annually through FY2025 for the purpose of encouraging

⁵⁰ CRS analysis of data provided to Congress by the State Department’s Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance, as of March 28, 2023.

⁵¹ MCC, “MCC’s Board Approves nearly \$500 Million for Tunisia Compact,” June 30, 2022. For background on the MCC and country eligibility requirements, see CRS Report RL32427, *Millennium Challenge Corporation: Overview and Issues*, by Nick M. Brown.


⁵² See, most recently, §7015f [“country notification requirements”] and §7041k [“Tunisia”] of Division K of P.L. 117-328.

democratic and economic reforms in Tunisia, subject to certification that the country is making progress on the aforementioned benchmarks.

Conditioning U.S. Foreign Assistance to Egypt

Since FY2012, Congress has passed appropriations legislation that withholds the obligation of FMF to Egypt until the Secretary of State certifies that Egypt is taking various steps toward supporting democracy and human rights. When Congress appropriates FMF to Egypt, it typically makes funds available for two years only, meaning that funds may expire if not obligated. Lawmakers included a national security waiver that allowed successive Administrations to waive congressionally mandated certification requirements under certain conditions through FY2020. In FY2021, Congress began withholding a portion of FMF without permitting it to be subject to a national security waiver (see **Figure 7**, below).

Figure 7. Egypt: Conditions on U.S. Military Assistance
In millions of current U.S. dollars



Source: Prepared by CRS based on Foreign Military Financing (FMF) allocations and terms from annual appropriations acts, FY2011-FY2023.

Since 2013, the Obama, Trump, and Biden Administrations have all taken various actions (suspended weapons deliveries, ended cash flow financing, reprogrammed aid, and withheld assistance) to limit U.S.-Egyptian military cooperation. The Trump Administration reprogrammed \$65.7 million in FY2017 FMF due to Egypt’s relationship with North Korea and Egypt’s restrictive law on NGOs.⁵³ The Biden Administration has twice reprogrammed FMF for Egypt (see text box below).

Biden Administration Reprogramming of U.S. Military Aid to Egypt

⁵³ Congressional Notification Transmittal Sheet, Mary K. Water, Assistant Secretary of Legislative Affairs, January 23, 2018.

FY2020 FMF: Section 7041(a)(3) of the FY2020 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 116-94) provided \$1.3 billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) “to remain available until September 30, 2021.” The act also withheld \$300 million in FMF unless the Secretary of State could make a certification on democracy-related conditions in Egypt. On September 14, 2021, the Administration notified Congress of its intent to obligate the remaining \$300 million in FY2020 FMF using the authority in Section 7041(a)(3)(A) of P.L. 116-94, which exempts FY2020 FMF funds from certification if used for “counterterrorism, border security, and nonproliferation programs” for Egypt.⁵⁴ In its communications to Congress, the Administration stated that it could not certify that Egypt is taking sustained and effective steps related to the human rights-related conditions. Because these human rights concerns remained, the State Department said that it would not move forward with the obligation of **\$130 million in FMF**, the maximum amount it could withhold,⁵⁵ unless Egypt affirmatively addressed U.S. concerns.⁵⁶ Egypt did not sufficiently address those concerns according to the Biden Administration. As a result, the State Department informed Congress that it would reprogram the \$130 million for climate resilience in the Pacific Islands.⁵⁷ This was the first instance of any Administration refusing to waive democracy and human rights-based conditions on U.S. FMF aid to Egypt since Congress inserted the criteria in FY2012.

FY2021 FMF: Section 7041(a)(3) of the FY2021 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 116-260) provided \$1.3 billion in FMF “to remain available until September 30, 2022.” The act also withheld \$225 million in FMF unless the Secretary of State could make a certification on democracy-related conditions in Egypt. The Act provided a national security waiver and, like the previous year, exempted funds for counterterrorism, border security, and nonproliferation programs from the certification requirement. However, as previously mentioned, the Act withheld an additional \$75 million in FMF (not subject to a national security waiver) until the Secretary of State could certify that the Government of Egypt was “making clear and consistent progress in releasing political prisoners and providing detainees with due process of law.” On September 15, 2022, the Administration notified Congress that once again, it would not certify that Egypt is taking sustained and effective steps related to the human rights-related conditions. Instead, it used the exemption for FMF in support of counterterrorism, border security, and nonproliferation programs to obligate \$95 million in FY2021 FMF. The Administration did certify that Egypt had made progress in releasing political prisoners in order to release the \$75 million in previously withheld FY2021 FMF.⁵⁸ However, then-Senate Appropriations Chairman Patrick Leahy reportedly placed a hold on the \$75 million obligation several weeks before the end of the fiscal year and the expiration of the funds; the Senator and the State Department were unable to resolve their differences over the intended obligation before the end of the fiscal year and due to the impasse, the funds expired, thereby resulting in a net reprogramming of **\$205 million in FMF**.⁵⁹

FY2022 FMF for Egypt expires September 30, 2023. P.L. 117-103, the FY2022 Consolidated Appropriations Act, withheld \$235 million in FMF from obligation based on the democracy and human rights certification requirement, subject to a national security waiver. It also withheld \$85 million (not subject to a waiver) based on Egypt’s lack of progress in releasing political prisoners.

These actions have reignited a long-standing debate in the broader foreign policy community over the efficacy of using foreign aid as leverage to promote greater respect for human rights in the Middle East and elsewhere.⁶⁰ In Egypt’s case, this debate usually breaks down between the human rights community, members of which seek to either end U.S. military aid to Egypt or

⁵⁴ This provision in appropriations for Egypt dates back to P.L. 113-76, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014 (passed January 2014). At the time, President Obama had initiated a review of U.S. military assistance to Egypt. P.L. 113-76 divided annual aid to Egypt into two tranches (\$976 million and \$576.8 million) and conditioned their obligation without providing a national security waiver. Thus, this provision may have been inserted to allow for greater flexibility in providing certain types of military aid to Egypt.

⁵⁵ Section 7015(c) in annual appropriations acts authorizes the president to transfer up to 10% of funds made available for FMF within an appropriations measure.

⁵⁶ U.S. Department of State, Press Briefing, September 15, 2021.

⁵⁷ U.S. Department of State, Congressional notification, September 29, 2022.

⁵⁸ U.S. Department of State, Press Briefing, November 8, 2022.

⁵⁹ Ellen Knickmeyer and Matthew Lee, “Senator’s human rights objections block some US aid to Egypt,” Associated Press, October 18, 2022.

⁶⁰ In 2021, the journal *Democracy in Exile*, published by the human rights organization known as Dawn (Democracy for the Arab World Now), published a series of articles on foreign aid conditionality in the Middle East. See <https://dawnmena.org/dawns-advocacy/aid-conditionality/>.

reprogram it as economic and democracy assistance,⁶¹ and those individuals or organizations who do not support modifying or conditioning long-standing military-to-military ties seen as contributing to Egypt's peaceful relationship with Israel⁶² and its efforts to counter terrorism in the Sinai.⁶³ Successive Administrations have often found themselves in the midst of the debate, attempting to balance the security relationship with congressional prerogatives to consider what many international monitoring organizations describe as the country's woeful human rights record. During a May 2023 Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on U.S. foreign assistance to the Middle East, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Leaf responded to a question on aid to Egypt, remarking that "we abide by the conditions obviously set by the Congress, but our going in proposition is that we seek unconditioned aid so that we can use it with the greatest flexibility."⁶⁴

In looking back at the past ten years, proponents of cutting aid argue that the lack of any credible, discernable change in Egypt's behavior is because the United States has not used all of its policy levers to pressure the Sisi government enough.⁶⁵ Others caution that conditioning all aid will only further harden Egypt's resolve to resist U.S. pressure and push Egypt to develop deeper ties with countries less concerned about its human rights record (such as Russia).⁶⁶

Overall, U.S. officials and lawmakers continue to grapple with how much leverage U.S. aid provides the United States government over Egypt. In 2021, Senator Chris Murphy noted that U.S.-Egyptian relations have atrophied since the arguable high point in the 1980s and that current U.S. leverage is overestimated by some participants in this debate.⁶⁷ According to David Schenker, a former Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs during the Trump Administration, the value of U.S. military aid to Egypt has declined over time and aid cuts or even sanctions would not effectively change Egypt's behavior.⁶⁸ Schenker argues that the U.S.-Egyptian bilateral relationship may need to be recalculated and reducing some aid to Egypt would allow the United States to send a signal to Cairo of its displeasure with its policies without causing a permanent diplomatic rupture.⁶⁹ This course of action appears to be what the Biden Administration may be pursuing vis-a-vis Egypt.

U.S. Aid to Support Expansion of the Abraham Accords

In late 2020 and early 2021, Israel reached agreements to normalize or improve its relations with four members of the Arab League: the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Morocco, and

⁶¹ Testimony of Michele Dunne, in U.S. Congress, House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Middle East, North Africa, and International Terrorism, *Egypt Politics-Economics-Human Rights*, hearing, 116th Cong., 2nd sess., September 9, 2020.

⁶² Jacob Magid, "Israeli Officials Cautioned Biden against Heavy Criticism of Egypt, Saudi Arabia," *Times of Israel*, September 2, 2021.

⁶³ Rachel Oswald, "Military Aid to Egypt Shapes Up as Human Rights Test for Biden," *Congressional Quarterly*, August 16, 2021.

⁶⁴ Testimony of Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Barbara A. Leaf, in U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Near East, South Asia, Central Asia, and Counterterrorism, *FY 2024 Budget Request for the Middle East and North Africa*, hearing, 118th Cong., 1st sess., May 31, 2023.

⁶⁵ Charles Dunne, "It's Time for Biden to Get Tough on Sisi," *Foreign Policy*, July 20, 2021.

⁶⁶ Gregory L. Aftandilian, "Hope versus Reality: The Efficacy of Using US Military Aid to Improve Human Rights in Egypt," *Parameters*, The U.S. Army War College Quarterly, 51, no. 3 (2021).

⁶⁷ Senator Murphy, *Congressional Record*, vol. 167, no. 132, p. S5129, July 28, 2021.

⁶⁸ David Schenker, "Getting Tough with Egypt Won't Work," The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, March 25, 2021.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

Sudan. The Trump Administration facilitated each of these agreements, known as the Abraham Accords, and provided U.S. security, diplomatic, or economic incentives for most of the countries in question. In order to foster broader recognition of Israel, some Members have sought to expand the Abraham Accords. For example:

- H.R.3099, the Special Envoy for the Abraham Accords Act (passed in the House) – would, among other things, establish within the Department of State a Special Envoy for the Abraham Accords “who shall serve as the primary advisor to, and coordinate efforts across, the United States Government relating to expanding and strengthening the Abraham Accords.” In the Senate, an amendment (SA 717) to S.2226 would establish within the Department of State the Office of the “Special Presidential Envoy for the Abraham Accords, Negev Forum, and Related Integration and Normalization Fora and Agreements.”
- H.R.3792, the U.S.-Israel Partnership and Abraham Accords Enhancement Act of 2023 – would, among other things, call on the Secretary of State to “expand people-to-people ties between Israel and other countries in the Middle East and North Africa region so as to further the goal of expanding and deepening the Abraham Accords.” The bill also would mandate that the USAID Administrator ensure that applicants from countries participating in the Abraham Accords are eligible for assistance under the Middle East Regional Cooperation competitive grant program.
- S.2413, the Regional Integration and Normalization Act – would, among other things, authorize a \$105 million “Regional Integration Opportunity Fund” for fiscal years 2024 through 2030. It also would authorize \$6 million for USAID’s MERC program and \$4 million for fiscal years 2024 through 2028 to finance cooperative projects relating to water resources, agriculture, and energy storage
- S.1777, the Abraham Accords Cybersecurity Cooperation Act of 2023 – would, among other things, authorize the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to engage in activities to strengthen network defense and cybersecurity collaboration between Abraham Accords countries and the United States.
- H.R.2973/S.1334, the MARITIME Act of 2023 – would, among other things, mandate that the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State, seek to build upon the Abraham Accords by developing a strategy to further regional integrated maritime domain awareness and interdiction capabilities.
- An amendment (SA 255) to S.2226, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024, would authorize the President to enter into “trilateral and multilateral cooperative project agreements with Israel and Abraham Accords countries, Negev Forum countries, and countries that have signed peace treaties with Israel, under the authority of section 27 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2767), to carry out research on and development, testing, evaluation, and joint production (including follow-on support) of defense articles and defense services to detect, track, and destroy armed unmanned aerial systems that threaten the United States, Israel, and partners in the Middle East.”

As some lawmakers consider how to advance the Abraham Accords through legislative action, as noted above, there are a number of existing programs that date to earlier periods of Israeli-Arab

peacemaking which receive ongoing State and Foreign Operations appropriations, including MERC and MEM.

For FY2024, the Biden Administration is seeking \$90 million in ESF for a new Middle East and North Africa Opportunity Fund that would provide U.S. officials with flexibility to respond to evolving developments in the MENA region. During his March testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Secretary of State Blinken suggested that this fund could be used to support programs that further the Abraham Accords.⁷⁰ One USAID official further specified that the MENA Opportunity Fund could be used to support the Negev Forum working groups if they “yield tangible areas for investment.”⁷¹

Great Power Competition and U.S. Assistance to the MENA Region

The Biden Administration has restated U.S. interests and priorities in its policy toward the Middle East, and U.S. officials have stated that the United States does not intend to cede influence in the MENA region to the PRC and/or Russia. The Administration also has suggested it may impose penalties on U.S. partners and adversaries who act to further PRC or Russian influence to the detriment of U.S. interests. During President Biden’s July 2022 visit to the Middle East, he set forth five declaratory principles—“partnership, deterrence, diplomacy, integration, and values”—to guide future U.S. engagement in the region:

1. Partnerships: The United States will support and strengthen partnerships with countries that subscribe to the rules-based international order, and we will make sure those countries can defend themselves against foreign threats.
2. Deterrence: The United States will not allow foreign or regional powers to jeopardize freedom of navigation through the Middle East’s waterways, including the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab al Mandab, nor tolerate efforts by any country to dominate another – or the region – through military buildups, incursions, or threats.
3. Diplomacy: The United States will not just aim to deter threats to regional stability, we will work to reduce tensions, de-escalate, and end conflicts wherever possible through diplomacy.
4. Integration: The United States will build political, economic, and security connections between U.S. partners wherever possible, while respecting each country’s sovereignty and independent choices.
5. Values: The United States will always promote human rights and the values enshrined in the UN Charter.⁷²

Pursuit of objectives aligned with these principles may include foreign assistance initiatives, including security assistance, stabilization assistance, development assistance, economic assistance, and support for civil society and human rights. This may include obligation of funds available under the Counter PRC Influence Fund (CPIF). A comparable Countering Russian Influence Fund (CRIF) authorizes the use of foreign assistance in selected countries in Europe

⁷⁰ CQ Congressional Transcripts, “House Foreign Affairs Committee Holds Hearing on Fiscal Year 2024 Budget Request for Department of State,” March 23, 2023; U.S. Congress, House Foreign Affairs Committee, *The State of American Diplomacy in 2023: Growing Conflicts, Budget Challenges, and Great Power Competition*, 118th Cong., 1st sess., March 23, 2023.

⁷¹ Testimony of USAID Deputy Assistant Administrator Jeanne Pryor, in U.S. Congress, House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Middle East, North Africa, and Central Asia, *Fiscal Year 2024 Budget Request for Near Eastern Affairs*, hearing, 118th Cong., 1st sess., June 13, 2023.

⁷² The White House, “Fact Sheet: The United States Strengthens Cooperation with Middle East Partners to Address 21st Century Challenges,” July 16, 2022.

and the Caucasus, but not the MENA region. The Biden Administration is requesting \$400 million for the CPIF for FY2024. In the 118th Congress, H.R. 1157 would authorize \$325 million for each of fiscal years 2023 through 2027 for a global Countering the PRC Malign Influence Fund.

U.S. Support for Transition in Libya

The Biden Administration has raised the profile of U.S. diplomatic engagement on Libya, providing vocal support for the implementation of the October 2020 ceasefire agreement and for the holding of national elections delayed in December 2021. USAID implements programs in Libya intended to improve government transparency, public sector financial management, electricity and other service delivery, and responsiveness at the national and local levels. U.S. programs also support the Libya High National Election Commission and other actors to help prepare for planned elections. The USAID Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Stabilization's Office for Transition Initiatives (OTI) also administers Transition Initiatives (TI) and non-TI funding for programs in Libya.

Table 7. U.S. Bilateral Aid to Libya FY2020-FY2024 Request

In millions of current U.S. dollars

Account	FY2020 Actual	FY2021 Actual	FY2022 Actual	FY2023 Request	FY2024 Request
ESF	26.60	20.00	14.80	40.00	12.50
IMET	—	—	—	—	0.25
INCLE	0.57	0.60	—	—	—
NADR	—	2.00	3.00	4.50	3.20
TI	6.92	18.33	13.26	n/a	n/a
Total	34.09	40.93	31.06	44.50	15.95

Source: Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs Congressional Budget Justifications (FY2021-FY2024), FY2023 Joint Explanatory Statement for H.R. 2617, and CRS calculations and rounding. n/a/ means not available.

The U.S. Embassy in Tripoli closed in 2014 and has not reopened, although U.S. diplomats and officials are visiting Libya with increasing frequency and continue to engage with Libyans and monitor U.S. aid programs via the Libya External Office (LEO) at the U.S. Embassy in Tunisia. A State Department spokesperson said in May 2021, “Our intent is to begin to resume operations in Libya as soon as the security situation permits and we have the necessary security measures in place. The process for that to occur, however, entails careful logistical and security planning, plus interagency coordination to meet security and legal requirements.”⁷³

In March 2023, the Biden Administration transmitted to Congress its detailed plans for the implementation of U.S. assistance programs under the Global Fragility Act to contribute to Libya's stability over the coming 10-year period. Elements of these plans focus specifically on southern Libya, where several armed groups, including groups from conflict-stricken neighboring Sudan, remain active.

⁷³ Dan De Luce, “Nearly a decade after Benghazi, the U.S. is quietly returning to Libya,” *NBC News*, May 27, 2021.

Appendix A. FY2024 MENA Foreign Operations Appropriations Legislative Summary

On July 12 and 20, 2023, the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations marked up the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2024 (H.R. 4665 and S. 2438), respectively. The following table summarizes provisions related to the MENA region contained in the House and Senate bill texts and accompanying reports (H. Rept. 118-146 and S.118-71).

Country	House Provisions	Senate Provisions
Egypt	<p>The bill provides not less than \$125 million in ESF, of which not less than \$40 million should be made available for higher education programs, including not less than \$15 million for scholarships, and provides not less than \$1.3 billion in FMF to remain available until September 30, 2025. The bill requires, prior to funds being made available, the Secretary of State to certify and report that Egypt is: (1) sustaining the strategic relationship with the U.S., and (2) meeting its obligations under the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty.</p> <p>The accompanying House report allocates \$1.375 billion for FMF, \$3.5 million for NADR programs, and \$2 million for IMET. Overall, the Committee recommendation includes \$1.51 billion for assistance for Egypt, including an additional \$75 million in FMF “to make up for the fiscal year 2021 FMF that expired.” The report also stipulates that the Secretary of State shall update the required report concerning the treatment of Christian communities in Egypt.</p>	<p>The bill provides not less than \$125 million in ESF, of which not less than \$40 million should be made available for higher education programs, including not less than \$15 million for scholarships, and provides not less than \$1.3 billion in FMF to remain available until September 30, 2025. The bill requires, prior to funds being made available, the Secretary of State to certify and report that Egypt is: (1) sustaining the strategic relationship with the U.S., and (2) meeting its obligations under the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty.</p> <p>Unlike the House bill, the Senate bill specifies that \$225 million of FMF shall be withheld from obligation until the Secretary of State certifies and reports that the Government of Egypt is taking sustained and effective steps to: (1) strengthen the rule of law, democratic institutions, and human rights in Egypt, including to protect religious minorities and the rights of women, which are in addition to steps taken during the previous calendar year; (2) implement reforms that protect freedoms of expression, association, and peaceful assembly, including for civil society organizations, human rights defenders, and the media to function without interference; (3) hold Egyptian security forces accountable; (4) investigate and prosecute cases of extrajudicial killings and forced disappearances; (5) provide regular access for U.S. officials to monitor such assistance in areas where the assistance is used; and (6) provide American</p>

		<p>citizens with fair and commensurate compensation for injuries and losses caused by the Egyptian military.</p> <p>The accompanying Senate report specifically highlights the cases of Hosam Khalaf, Salah Soltan, Anas El-Beltagy, and Alaa Abdel Fattah for the Secretary of State to consider when determining whether to make the required certification.</p> <p>The Senate bill further stipulates that an additional \$100 million of FMF funds shall be withheld (no national security waiver) from obligation until the Secretary of State determines and reports that the Government of Egypt is making clear and consistent progress in reducing the number of political prisoners, providing detainees with due process of law, and preventing the intimidation and harassment of American citizens.</p> <p>The accompanying Senate report stipulates that the Secretary of State shall update the report on: (1) Egypt's compliance with end-use monitoring agreements for the use of U.S. military equipment in the Sinai during the preceding 12 months; (2) the access requested by, and granted to, U.S. Government personnel to conflict areas in the Sinai for purposes of monitoring the use of U.S. equipment; (3) incidents of harassment, threats, and arbitrary detention against American citizens and their family members in Egypt and the United States including whether such incidents constitute a "pattern of acts of intimidation or harassment" for purposes of section 6 of the Arms Export Control Act (22. U.S.C. 2756), as well as any steps taken by the Secretary in response to such incidents.</p>
Iran	Section 7007 of the bill continues language from the prior year prohibiting assistance for the government of Iran. Funds appropriated under the Diplomatic Programs, ESF, and NADR accounts shall be made	Section 7007 of the bill continues language from the prior year prohibiting assistance for the government of Iran. Funds appropriated under the Diplomatic Programs, ESF, and NADR accounts shall be made

available to support: (1) U.S. policy to prevent Iran from achieving the capability to produce or otherwise obtain a nuclear weapon; (2) an expeditious response to any violation of UNSC resolutions; (3) the implementation, enforcement, and renewal of sanctions against Iran; and (4) democracy programs in Iran. The Act also requires a semi-annual report required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, and a report on sanctions.

The bill prohibits any funds from being: (1) used to implement or enforce any agreement with Iran regarding its nuclear program or renewal of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action unless such agreement has received the concurrence of two-thirds of the Senate; (2) made available to any foreign entity or person subject to U.N. or U.S. sanctions; (3) used to revoke the designation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a Foreign Terrorist Organization.

The Committee notes the sweeping internet restrictions, content censorship, and mobile network disruptions imposed by the Government of Iran following the onset of nationwide protests in September 2022. The Committee supports continued partnership between the Department of State, U.S. Agency for Global Media, Open Technology Fund, and other departments and agencies to implement the comprehensive strategy to promote internet freedom access in Iran, as required by section 414 of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (Public Law 112–159).

Iraq

The bill modifies language from the prior year and makes funds available under Titles III and IV for: (1) bilateral economic and international security assistance, including in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI); (2) stabilization assistance; (3) strengthening of government transparency and accountability, the justice sector, and anti-corruption efforts; (4) humanitarian assistance, including

available to support “programs and activities described under this section in the report accompanying this Act.” The bill and accompanying report stipulate that the Secretary of State shall report: (1) the status of U.S. bilateral sanctions on Iran; (2) the reimposition and renewed enforcement of secondary sanctions; and (3) the impact such sanctions have had, if any, on reducing Iran’s destabilizing activities in the Middle East. The report also requires a semi-annual report required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, and a report on sanctions.

The bill modifies language from the prior year and makes funds available under Titles III and IV for: (1) bilateral economic and international security assistance, including in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI); (2) stabilization assistance, including in Anbar province; (3) strengthening of government transparency and accountability, the justice sector, and anti-corruption efforts; (4)

in KRI; (5) programs to protect religious and ethnic minority populations; and (6) programs for increasing U.S. private sector investment. No funds may be available to any entity controlled by or affiliated with the Badr Organization or any entity that is a proxy of Iran.

The House report directs funds be made available under IDA and MRA accounts to support programs that address the needs of IDPs and refugees in Iraq, including in the KRI, as well as their host communities. Furthermore, funds under ESF should continue to support programs that mitigate the impact of IDPs and refugees. The Committee encourages “the prioritization of psychosocial support programs to benefit religious and ethnic minorities affected by ISIS” and supports USAID efforts to help local communities overcome trauma and reject violent extremism. Moreover, the Committee directs that the Secretary of State submit a report on the status of land seizures in Iraq targeting minority communities. The Committee also directs the Secretary and the Administrator of USAID to include funds to be made available for supporting American-style higher education institutions in Iraq. The report stipulates that the Secretary submit “an integrated security assistance strategy for assistance” for Iraq.

humanitarian assistance, including in KRI; (5) programs to protect religious and ethnic minority populations; and (6) programs for increasing U.S. private sector investment.

In the accompanying Senate report, the Committee recommends: (1) \$150 million under ESF, of which \$10 million is for scholarships for students in Iraq, including in the KRI, at not-for-profit, American-style educational institutions, \$25 million is for democracy programs via the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights (DRL), and Labor, \$1.5 million is for new democracy programs that strengthen elections processes and democratic political parties, and not less than \$2.5 million is for justice sector assistance; (2) \$250 million in FMF; (3) that funds for assistance for Iraq be provided for UNDP’s Funding Facility for Stabilization and Iraq Crisis Response and Resilience Program to address the stabilization and humanitarian needs of displaced Iraqis, including Yazidi populations and Iraqi returnees from Syria; and (4) continued funding for the Funding Facility through 2026.

The report directs the Secretary of State to report on steps taken to support Iraqi institutions of higher education that have accepted students from Afghanistan. It also directs the Secretary of State to submit a report on the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program with information about, among other things, the number of Iraqi Priority 2 Direct Access Program adjudications since the resumption of the program on March 1, 2022. Finally, the report names Iraq as one of the countries it recommends for funding for humanitarian demining activities at levels not less than the prior fiscal year.

Israel

The bill provides \$3.3 billion in FMF, including not less than \$725.3 million in off-shore procurement. The Committee recommends \$3 million to

The bill provides \$3.3 billion in FMF, including not less than \$725.3 million in off-shore procurement. The Committee recommends \$3 million to

support USAID-Israel cooperative projects to address sustainability challenges relating to water resources, agriculture, and energy storage consistent with section 1278 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (Public Law 116–283) and not less than \$5 million for refugees from the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and other refugees resettling in Israel.

support USAID-Israel cooperative projects to address sustainability challenges relating to water resources, agriculture, and energy storage consistent with section 1278 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (Public Law 116–283) and not less than \$5 million for refugees from the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and other refugees resettling in Israel.

The report directs the Secretary of State and USAID Administrator, as appropriate, to ensure that funds made available by the act and prior acts that are made available for cooperative programs with Israel include sufficient safeguards to protect against intellectual property theft, research and development, and other threats by China.

Jordan

The bill provides not less than \$1.65 billion for assistance to Jordan, including not less than \$845.1 million for budget support for the Government of Jordan and \$425 million in FMF. The House report states that the Secretary of State and the Administrator of USAID shall continue to support economic reforms, including budget support, to help ensure Jordan’s long-term stability, strengthen Jordan’s borders with Iraq and Syria, and help mitigate the impact of hosting large numbers of refugees. Of the \$1.65 billion for assistance provided, the Committee directs not less than \$13.6 million in NADR and \$4 million in IMET, which is the same as the request.

The bill provides not less than \$1.65 billion for assistance to Jordan, including not less than \$845.1 million for budget support for the Government of Jordan and \$425 million in FMF. In the accompanying Senate report, the Committee: (1) recommends \$3.689 million in INCLE funding; (2) names Jordan as one of the countries it recommends for funding for humanitarian demining activities at levels not less than the prior fiscal year; and (3) directs the Secretary of State to submit a report regarding the implementation status of the Memorandum of Understanding between the U.S. and Jordan, which may be submitted in classified form, if necessary.

Lebanon

The bill makes funds available under Titles III and IV, but modifies language from the prior year by deleting language making ESF assistance for Lebanon available notwithstanding any other provision of law. The Committee directs that: (1) support be continued at not less than the prior year under ESF for the Lebanon scholarship program and under DA for the undergraduate and graduate scholarship program for refugees in Lebanon; (2) the Administrator of USAID regularly consult with

The bill makes funds available under Titles III and IV, but unlike the House bill, it makes ESF assistance for Lebanon available notwithstanding any other provision of law. The Committee: (1) recommends not less than the budget request for assistance for Lebanon, and continues conditions on assistance consistent with the prior fiscal year; (2) supports additional assistance for Lebanon under the IDA and MRA headings; (3) supports efforts to help facilitate the resolution of border disputes between Lebanon and

the Committees on Appropriations regarding how the programs will be administered consistent with the prior year and by not-for-profit educational institutions in Lebanon; (3) the Secretary of State and the Administrator of USAID consult with the Committees on Appropriations on funding for institutions of higher education, including funding made available pursuant to section 7060(a)(2). The Committee supports continued funding for the Middle East Partnership Initiative scholarship program at not less than the prior year. Scholarships should be made available for institutions that meet standards comparable to those required for American accreditation and should be awarded in a manner consistent with prior fiscal years, including on an open and competitive basis.

The Act specifies that INCLE and FMF funds may be made available for the Lebanese Internal Security Forces (ISF) and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to address security and stability requirements in areas affected by the conflict in Syria. FMF funds may be used only to: (1) professionalize the LAF, (2) strengthen border security and combat terrorism, and (3) implement U.N. Security Resolution 1701. FMF funds may not be obligated for assistance for the LAF until the Secretary of State submits to the Committees on Appropriations a spend plan, including actions to be taken to ensure equipment provided to the LAF is only used for the intended purposes, and any notification shall include any funds specifically intended for lethal military equipment. Aid shall not be made available for the ISF or the LAF if these entities fall under control by a foreign terrorist organization. The Committee directs the Secretary of State to (1) ensure that funds for assistance to the LAF and ISF are not used to fund any action in Lebanese military courts against American citizens; and (2) regularly consult with the Committees on Appropriations

Israel, and directs the Secretary of State to provide a briefing on steps taken during the prior fiscal year to resolve such disputes; (4) recommends \$150 million in FMF; (5) recommends \$115 million in ESF, of which \$5 million is for the purchase of American-made solar panels for teaching hospitals in Lebanon and \$14 million is for scholarships for Lebanese students with high financial need to attend not-for-profit educational institutions in Lebanon; (5) recommends \$8.9 million in INCLE; (6) expects that no funds made available by the act will benefit or legitimize Hizballah or any other foreign terrorist organizations operating in Lebanon; (7) supports additional stipends for the LAF, if warranted; and (8) recommends \$10 million in DA to continue the undergraduate and graduate scholarship program for refugees in Lebanon, including Palestinians and Syrians (such funds are in addition to funds made available for assistance for Lebanon under the ESF heading and are to be administered consistent with the Lebanon scholarship program at not-for-profit educational institutions in Lebanon). Scholarships should be made available for institutions that meet standards comparable to those required for American accreditation and should be awarded in a manner consistent with prior fiscal years, including on an open and competitive basis.

The Act specifies that INCLE and FMF funds may be made available for the Lebanese Internal Security Forces (ISF) and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to address security and stability requirements in areas affected by the conflict in Syria. FMF funds may be used only to: (1) professionalize the LAF, (2) strengthen border security and combat terrorism, and (3) implement U.N. Security Resolution 1701. FMF funds may not be obligated for assistance for the LAF until the Secretary of State submits to the Committees on Appropriations a spend plan, including actions to be taken to

	regarding the rigorous implementation of this provision, the activities of the LAF, and assistance provided by the U.S.	ensure equipment provided to the LAF is only used for the intended purposes, and any notification shall include any funds specifically intended for lethal military equipment. Aid shall not be made available for the ISF or the LAF if these entities fall under control by a foreign terrorist organization.
Libya	No funds under Titles III through VI may be obligated or expended for assistance for Libya except as provided through the regular notification procedures of the Committees on Appropriations.	The bill directs not less than \$32 million shall be made available for stabilization assistance for Libya, including support for a United Nations-facilitated political process and border security, provided: (1) that the limitation on the uses of funds for certain infrastructure projects (division K of Public Law 113–76) shall apply; and (2) funds made available shall be made available for the purposes enumerated in section 509(a) of the Global Fragility Act of 2019 (22 U.S.C. 9808). In the accompanying report, Libya is one of the countries recommended for funding for humanitarian demining activities at levels not less than the prior fiscal year.
Morocco and Western Sahara	The bill makes funds available under Title III and IV for assistance for Morocco. The report allocates for Morocco not less than \$10 million in DA, \$10 million in ESF, \$10 million FMF, and \$4 million in INCLE. The Committee directs that, prior to the obligation of such funds, THE Secretary of State, in consultation with the Administrator of USAID, shall consult with the Committees on Appropriations on the proposed uses of such funds. The report expresses concern for commercial disputes between the U.S. entities and the Government of Morocco, and directs the Secretary to facilitate the timely resolution of such disputes. The report also directs the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Administrator of USAID, to develop and submit “a multiyear strategy for the promotion of multilateral cooperation projects between the United States, Israel, Morocco, and other African	The bill makes funds available under Title III and IV for assistance for Morocco. The accompanying report allocates \$10 million in FMF and directs that Middle East Partnership Initiative funds be made available for assistance for Morocco at levels above the prior fiscal year. In the report, the Committee also directs that MEPI funds be made available for assistance for programs to improve education, healthcare, economic opportunities, and for other assistance for the Western Sahara.

countries.”

The report states that economic assistance “shall be made available for assistance for the Western Sahara” via the Middle East Partnership Initiative. The report separately stipulates that “the Secretary of State shall continue to support a United Nations-led political process that achieves a just, lasting, and mutually acceptable political solution in accordance with relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions.”

Saudi Arabia

The bill continues prior year language specifying that no IMET funds may be made available for assistance for the Government of Saudi Arabia, and that none of the funds made available by this Act and prior Acts may be “obligated or expended by the Export-Import Bank of the United States to guarantee, insure, or extend (or participate in the extension of) credit in connection with the export of nuclear technology, equipment, fuel, materials, or other nuclear technology-related goods or services to Saudi Arabia unless the Government of Saudi Arabia—(A) has in effect a nuclear cooperation agreement pursuant to Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153); (B) has committed to renounce uranium enrichment and reprocessing on its territory under that agreement; and (C) has signed and implemented an Additional Protocol to its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency.”

Syria

Section 7007 of the bill continues language from the prior year prohibiting assistance for the government of Syria. The Act provides funds under Titles III and IV for nonlethal stabilization assistance for Syria, provided that the Secretary of State takes all practicable steps to ensure that mechanisms are in place for monitoring, oversight, and control of such funds. The Act prohibits any funds from: (1) supporting or otherwise legitimizing the government of Iran, a foreign

The bill continues prior year language specifying that no IMET funds may be made available for assistance for the Government of Saudi Arabia, and that none of the funds made available by this Act and prior Acts may be “obligated or expended by the Export-Import Bank of the United States to guarantee, insure, or extend (or participate in the extension of) credit in connection with the export of nuclear technology, equipment, fuel, materials, or other nuclear technology-related goods or services to Saudi Arabia unless the Government of Saudi Arabia—(A) has in effect a nuclear cooperation agreement pursuant to Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153); (B) has committed to renounce uranium enrichment and reprocessing on its territory under that agreement; and (C) has signed and implemented an Additional Protocol to its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency.”

Section 7007 of the bill continues language from the prior year prohibiting assistance for the government of Syria. The Act provides funds under Titles III and IV for nonlethal stabilization assistance for Syria. The Act prohibits any funds from: (1) supporting or otherwise legitimizing the government of Iran, a foreign terrorist organization, or a proxy of Iran in Syria, (2) furthering the strategic objectives of the Government of the Russian Federation, or (3)

terrorist organization, or a proxy of Iran in Syria, (2) furthering the strategic objectives of the Government of the Russian Federation, or (3) being used in areas controlled by the Asad government or made available to an organization or entity effectively controlled by an Asad official or their immediate family member. Funds may only be made available following consultation with the appropriate congressional committees and are subject to the regular notification procedures of the Committees on Appropriations. The diversion or destruction of any funds made available for assistance for Syria must be notified.

The Committee directs continued support for demining activities in Syria, and encourages USAID to support projects that improve the availability of clean water in Syria. The Committee encourages the Secretary of State and the Administrator of USAID to utilize humanitarian and stabilization funds for the implementation of lifesaving interventions in Syria and to encourage increased donations for such assistance from U.S. allies and partners. The Committee supports the implementation of the strategy to guide appropriate action against narcotics production and trafficking in Syria. The report directs the Secretary of State to: (1) update the Committees on Appropriations on current and planned efforts to address and remedy the growing security threat and humanitarian challenges posed by conditions at the al-Hol displacement camp and associated ISIS-detention sites administered by the Syrian Democratic Forces; and (2) to submit a report in unclassified form (but may include a classified annex) on reported unlawful prisons run by Islamist militias in northwest Syria.

No funds under Titles III through VI may be obligated or expended for assistance for Tunisia except as provided through the regular notification procedures of the Committees on Appropriations. Prior to the initial obligation of funds, the Secretary of State or the

being used in areas controlled by the Asad government or associated forces.

The Committee recommends \$105 million in ESF funding, of which \$11 million is for DRL programs and not less than \$25 million shall be made available to implement the U.S. Government Al-Hol Action Plan. The report also recommends \$10 million in INCLE, and names Syria as one of the countries it recommends for funding for humanitarian demining activities at levels not less than the prior fiscal year.

Funds may only be made available following consultation with the appropriate congressional committees and are subject to the regular notification procedures of the Committees on Appropriations.

The bill directs funds appropriated under Titles III and IV be made available for assistance for programs to improve economic growth and opportunity, support democratic governance and civil society, protect due process of law, and maintain regional stability and security. The

Tunisia

Administrator of USAID shall submit to the Committees on Appropriations a spend plan for funds made available for Tunisia.

In the report, the Committee directs funds appropriated by this Act and made available for assistance for Tunisia be prioritized towards fighting global terrorism, promoting democracy, and encouraging economic prosperity. Funding to support government agencies, or government-sponsored programs, should only be made available after the Tunisian government demonstrates a commitment to political and social tolerance, respect for democratic institutions and rule of law, responsible treatment of migrants, and respect for independent media and human rights.

Act requires the Secretary of State to report the extent to which: (1) the Government of Tunisia is implementing economic reforms, countering corruption, and taking credible steps to restore constitutional order and democratic governance that are in addition to steps taken in the preceding fiscal year; (2) the Government of Tunisia is maintaining the independence of the judiciary, inappropriately utilizing military courts, and holding security forces who commit human rights abuses accountable; and (3) the Tunisian military has remained an apolitical and professional institution.

In the accompanying report, the Committee recommends \$15 million in DA, \$15 million in ESF, \$4 million in INCLE, and \$45 million in FMF. The report stipulates not less than \$15 million to support civil society organizations in Tunisia. The Committee remains concerned with the authoritarian actions by the President of Tunisia. The Committee directs the DFC CEO, in consultation with the heads of other relevant Federal agencies, to consider supporting strategic infrastructure projects in Tunisia, including through ERI. The report requires a spend plan for Tunisia.

West Bank/Gaza

The bill includes language carried over and—in some places—modified from the prior year regarding conditions on any assistance for the West Bank and Gaza.

Prior to obligating ESF funds to the West Bank and Gaza, the Secretary of State shall report to the Committees on Appropriations that the purpose of this assistance is to: (1) advance Middle East peace; (2) improve security in the region; (3) continue support for transparent and accountable government institutions; (4) promote a private sector economy; or (5) address urgent humanitarian needs. No ESF funds shall be made available if the Palestinians: (1) obtain full membership at the United Nations outside an agreement negotiated with Israel, or (2) initiate or actively support an International Criminal Court investigation that subjects Israeli nationals to an investigation for

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alleged crimes against Palestinians, subject to waiver by the Secretary of State. Funds appropriated by this act for ESF are made available consistent with Section 1004(a) of the Taylor Force Act (Title X of Division S of P.L. 115-141); in line with the Taylor Force Act, the Committee underscores the importance of “continued efforts to fully implement the law, including increasing diplomatic efforts to end the PA’s practice of paying salaries to terrorists serving in Israeli prisons and paying for acts of terrorism.” The Act makes funds subject to the reporting requirements in section 1404 of the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008 (P.L. 110-252), including a description of modifications, if any, to the security strategy of the PA.

The Committee directs continued support for demining activities in the West Bank, and recommends not less than the prior year level under ESF for the Nita M. Lowey Middle East Partnership for Peace Act (title VIII of division K of Public Law 116-260) for fiscal year 2024 to continue critically needed people-to-people programming and joint economic partnerships between Israelis and Palestinians. The Act requires the Secretary of State to certify, 30 days prior to the initial obligation of funds for the bilateral West Bank and Gaza Program, to the Committees on Appropriations that the Controller General will have access to U.S. financial information to review the uses of ESF aid for the West Bank and Gaza. Up to \$1.5 million may be used by the Office of Inspector General of the USAID for audits, investigations, and other activities in furtherance of stipulated requirements. The Office of Palestinian Affairs in Jerusalem may not administer or manage funds appropriated under Title III of this Act.

The report also directs the Secretary of State to: (1) designate a U.S. Direct Hire employee to review a significant

alleged crimes against Palestinians, subject to waiver by the Secretary of State. The President may waive the provisions of section 1003 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (Public Law 100-204) if the President determines and certifies that the Palestinian have not, after date of enactment: (1) obtained full membership at the United Nations outside an agreement negotiated with Israel, or (2) initiated or actively supported an International Criminal Court investigation that subjects Israeli nationals to an investigation for alleged crimes against Palestinians. Not less than 90 days after the President is unable to make the above certification, the President may waive section 1003 of Public Law 100-204 if the President determines and certifies that the Palestinians have entered into direct and meaningful negotiations with Israel, with any waiver being effective for no more than 6 months at a time and not applying beyond 12 months after enactment of this Act. Funds appropriated by this act for ESF are made available consistent with Section 1004(a) of the Taylor Force Act (Title X of Division S of P.L. 115-141). The Act makes funds subject to the reporting requirements in section 1404 of the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008 (P.L. 110-252), including a description of modifications, if any, to the security strategy of the PA.

The bill requires the Secretary of State to certify, 30 days prior to the initial obligation of funds for the bilateral West Bank and Gaza Program, to the Committees on Appropriations that the Controller General will have access to U.S. financial information to review the uses of ESF aid for the West Bank and Gaza. Up to \$1.3 million may be used by the Office of Inspector General of the USAID for audits, investigations, and other activities in furtherance of stipulated requirements, provided such

and representative selection of educational materials utilized by UNRWA schools in the West Bank and Gaza and submit a report on whether these educational materials contain incitement to violence, hatred, or other inappropriate materials; (2) include specific examples of infractions in such report; (3) submit a report on compliance with UNRWA's policy on neutrality and impartiality of employees, including on how UNRWA conducts vetting and background check processes.

No funds appropriated under titles III through VI may be: (A) used to provide any form of assistance to the Palestinian Broadcasting Corporation; (B) made available for: (1) recognizing or honoring individuals who commit or have committed acts of terrorism, or (2) any educational institution located in the West Bank or Gaza named after an individual who has committed an act of terrorism; (C) obligated for (1) assistance for the PLO, (2) salaries of personnel of the PA located in Gaza, (3) assistance to Hamas or Hamas-controlled entities, or (4) any power-sharing government of which Hamas is a member, or that results from an agreement with Hamas and over which Hamas exercises undue influence; or (D) provided to support a Palestinian state unless the Secretary of State certifies that the governing entity of a new Palestinian state: (1) demonstrates a firm commitment to peaceful coexistence with Israel; (2) takes appropriate measures to counter terrorism and terrorist financing in the West Bank and Gaza; (3) terminates all claims or states of belligerency; (4) respects and acknowledges the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of every state in the region, as well as their right to live in peace free from threats or acts of force; (5) respects freedom of navigation through international waterways in the

funds are in addition to funds otherwise available for such purposes. The Office of Palestinian Affairs in Jerusalem may not administer or manage funds appropriated under Title III of this Act.

The bill directs the Secretary of State to submit a report, no later than 90 days after enactment, detailing steps taken by the PA and the Government of Israel to counter incitement of violence and to promote peace and coexistence between Israelis and Palestinians.

No funds appropriated by this bill to carry out the provisions of chapter 4 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 may be obligated or expended with respect to providing funds to the Palestinian Authority, subject to a waiver from the President, in which case: (1) any waiver shall be effective no more than 6 months at a time and shall not apply beyond 12 months after the bill is enacted; (2) the President shall report justifications and steps that the PA has taken to arrest terrorists, confiscate weapons and dismantle the terrorist infrastructure; and (3) the Secretary of State must certify that the PA: (A) has established a single treasury account for all PA financing and all financing mechanisms flow through this account; (B) no parallel financing mechanisms exist outside of the PA treasury account; (C) there is a single comprehensive civil service roster and payroll; and (D) the PA is acting to counter incitement of violence against Israelis and is supporting activities aimed at promoting peace, coexistence, and security cooperation with Israel.

No funds appropriated under titles III through VI may be: (A) used to provide any form of assistance to the Palestinian Broadcasting Corporation; (B) made available for: (1) recognizing or honoring individuals who commit or have committed acts of terrorism, or (2) any

area; and (6) accepts a framework for achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem. This restriction shall not apply to assistance intended to help reform the PA or the governing entity in order to help meet these requirements.

educational institution located in the West Bank or Gaza named after an individual who has committed an act of terrorism; (C) obligated for (1) assistance for the PLO, (2) salaries of personnel of the PA located in Gaza, (3) assistance to Hamas or Hamas-controlled entities, or (4) any power-sharing government of which Hamas is a member, or that results from an agreement with Hamas and over which Hamas exercises undue influence; (D) made available for obligation for security assistance until the Secretary of State reports on: (1) the benchmarks that have been established for security assistance for the West Bank and Gaza and on the extent of Palestinian compliance with such benchmarks; and (2) the steps being taken by the Palestinian Authority to end torture and other cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment of detainees, including by bringing to justice members of Palestinian security forces who commit such crimes; or (E) provided to support a Palestinian state unless the Secretary of State certifies that the governing entity of a new Palestinian state: (1) demonstrates a firm commitment to peaceful coexistence with Israel; (2) takes appropriate measures to counter terrorism and terrorist financing in the West Bank and Gaza; (3) terminates all claims or states of belligerency; (4) respects and acknowledges the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of every state in the region, as well as their right to live in peace free from threats or acts of force; (5) respects freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area; and (6) accepts a framework for achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem. This restriction shall not apply to assistance intended to help reform the PA or the governing entity in order to help meet these requirements.

In the accompanying Senate

report, the Committee: (1) recommends \$225 million in ESF for the West Bank and Gaza; (2) recommends another \$50 million in ESF funds specifically for the Nita M. Lowey Middle East Partnership for Peace Act (division K, title VIII of Public Law 116–260) (MEPPA); (3) directs the DFC CEO to increase engagement in, and programmatic support for, implementation of MEPPA and the Abraham Accords; (4) recommends \$42 million in INCLE; (5) recommends, as in fiscal year 2023, an additional \$75 million in MRA funding for the United Nations Relief and Works Agency [UNRWA] to maintain food assistance to vulnerable Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza in response to rising food and transportation costs; (6) urges the Secretary of State and USAID Administrator to continue to provide assistance to encourage Israeli-Palestinian reconciliation and to support municipal infrastructure improvements, such as water and sanitation, roads, and other community projects; (7) notes available funding for programs in the West Bank under the ESF heading in prior acts, and recommends funds from the act and prior acts under such heading be made available for youth empowerment and private business development programs; (8) directs the Secretary of State to brief the Committees on Appropriations on the report produced by the U.S. Security Coordinator for Israel and the Palestinian Authority regarding the shooting death of American citizen and journalist Shireen Abu Akleh; and (9) notes that Reconciliation programs between Israelis and Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza are supported with funds made available to implement MEPPA. The report also directs the Secretary of State to report, 90 days after the date of enactment, on reforms implemented by the UNRWA during the preceding

Yemen	<p>No funds under Titles III through VI may be obligated or expended for assistance for Yemen except as provided through the regular notification procedures of the Committees on Appropriations. The Committee recommendation includes funds appropriated under Title III and NADR for support of health, humanitarian, and stabilization efforts in Yemen, including demining operations and support for Yemeni local and community-based organizations. The report urges the Secretary of State to lead efforts to restore an independent, international, and adequately resourced human rights monitoring and reporting mechanism in Yemen as soon as possible. It also directs the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Administrator of USAID, to submit a report that addresses delivery of humanitarian assistance in Yemen and a plan of</p>	<p>calendar year, including (1) a detailed description of any plans to leverage future U.S. contributions to make progress on implementing additional reforms, as appropriate; (2) information on the degree to which UNRWA is complying with the policies and procedures described in subsection (d) and the areas in which the Department is partnering with UNRWA on new guidelines or reform efforts; (3) an updated description of the mechanisms UNRWA has in place to identify incitement and other unacceptable subject matters, including anti-Semitic content, in locally produced textbooks; (4) the procedures in place to substitute such material with curricula that emphasizes the importance of human rights, tolerance, and non-discrimination; and (5) a description of steps taken to determine the credibility of the source of, and verify, claims, when made, that UNRWA is not complying with such policies and procedures, as well as any steps taken to respond to claims that are determined not to be credible.</p> <p>No funds under Titles III through VI may be obligated or expended for assistance for Yemen except as provided through the regular notification procedures of the Committees on Appropriations.</p> <p>In the accompanying report, the Committee recommends (1) \$3 million in ESF for DRL programming for Yemen; and (2) not less than \$7 million under DA, ESF, and Assistance for Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia for programs to rescue scholars from various countries, including Yemen, to be administered by DRL in consultation with other relevant entities, as appropriate, which shall be awarded on an open and competitive basis.</p>
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Source: Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2024 and accompanying report.

Notes: For brevity, authors have paraphrased bill text and accompanying committee report.

Appendix. Common Foreign Assistance Acronyms and Abbreviations

CCF	Complex Crises Fund
CTEF	Counter-ISIL Train and Equip Fund
DA	Development Assistance
DOD	Department of Defense
ESF	Economic Support Fund
FMF	Foreign Military Financing
GHP	Global Health Programs
IDA	International Disaster Assistance
IMET	International Military Education and Training
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INCLE	International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement
NEA	Near Eastern Affairs
MCC	Millennium Challenge Corporation
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MRA	Migration and Refugees Assistance
NADR	Non-Proliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
PKO	Peacekeeping Operations
P.L. 480	Food for Peace/Food Aid
SFOPS	Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
T&E	Train & Equip
TI	Transition Initiatives
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development

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